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THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
A CRITICAL RACE THEORIST'S PERSPECTIVE

Alex M. Johnson, Jr.*
Over the last four years, I have taught a course in Critical Race
Theory at the University of Virginia School of Law three times.
Although each course is different, given the interplay between the
teacher and the students and the integration of new developments
into the course, there has been one constant subject that the stu
dents and I address: Of what import is the development of Critical
Race Theory for the legal profession and larger society? Can Criti
cal Race Theory have a positive or any effect for those outside legal
academia? This article represents an attempt to explore that ques
tion by focusing on the role that Critical Race Theory can have on
the legal profession.
Part I analyzes an issue that is often overlooked in a discussion
of our legal system: the continuing paucity of attorneys of color, in
particular black attomeys,1 in the legal profession. After demon
strating the lack of diversity in the legal profession, Part I explores
the dissonance between what law and lawyers espouse when it
comes to issues involving equality, civil rights, and the elimination
of racism and oppression in American society (hereinafter collec
tively referred to as "liberal social issues"), and what lawyers actu
ally do within the profession by paying singular attention to their
hiring practices. In other words, I examine how it is possible that
lawyers can so idealistically support liberal social issues, while at
the same time maintaining a system of self-selection (and to a lesser
* Vice Provost for Faculty Recruitment and Retention, University of Virginia; Mary and
Daniel Loughran Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1975, Clare
mont Men's College; J.D. 1978, UCLA. - Ed. I thank Jamila Braswell and Adrienne
Pruden for the excellent research assistance they have provided.

1. A debate, waged largely in the footnotes, has raged over whether persons who were
once classified as Negroes should be referred to as blacks or African-Americans and, if the
former, whether "black" should be capitalized. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and

Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighbor
hoods, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1595, 1596-97 n.8 (1995). My current practice is to use the terms

interchangeably although my preference is to refer to those individuals previously identified
as Negroes as blacks. Indeed, in this Article when I refer to an individual as "black" I am
referring to their racial identification. However, in keeping with my thesis that ethnicity
rather than race should be emphasized, when I do refer to an individual as an "African
American," I am referring to that individual's ethnic identity and not the individual's racial
identity. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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degree, laws) that is rife with substantive defects attributable to the
systemic effects of racism - disproportionately few minorities and
women within the profession and unequal treatment of those indi
viduals within the profession based on their racial identification and
gender. If there is any occupation in which one would expect to see
meaningful equality of opportunity and results, given the profes
sion's lofty ideals and pronouncements, it should be the legal pro
fession, but the reality is quite the contrary. In short, lawyers do
not practice what they preach.
Part II explains the dissonance between the ideals and rhetoric
espoused within the legal profession and the reality of practice
through an analysis of group dynamics and the benefits associated
with group membership. Building upon Richard McAdams's recent
work in law and economics on relative preferences,2 and on how
intragroup and intergroup conflict are created,3 Part II contends
that lawyers as a group gain self-esteem and power vis-a-vis other
groups with their visible and vocal commitment to liberal social is
sues. Conversely, however, lawyers qua lawyers are situated as in
dividuals as part of the larger group and, as a result, gain intragroup
status by reproducing existing racial dynamics by oppressing minor
ities and enforcing subordination.
Part III represents an explicit return to Critical Race Theory by
merging insights gleaned from Part I to address and remedy the
issues identified in Part II. In particular, Part III presents two dis
similar solutions to the dissonance inherent in the legal profession
concerning the underrepresentation of minorities within its ranks.
The first remedy suggested - destabilizing racial identity - repre
sents an attempt to construct an intragroup identity as attorneys or
members of the bar that trumps the intergroup conflict that is pred
icated on distinct and differing racial identities. The second remedy
embraces an equality of result model rather than an equality of pro
cess model, and calls upon the profession to recognize that racial
differences - racial classifications and the identities they produce
- do exist among its members, but that the only way to eradicate

2. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 {1992) [hereinafter
McAdams, Relative Preferences]. For further discussion of the economic theory of relative
preferences, see infra notes 60·66 and accompanying text.
3. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003 {1995) [hereinafter McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict].
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the illegitimate results created by these differences4 is to destabilize
traditional notions of meritocracy.
In other words, Part III calls upon the legal profession to aggres
sively employ affirmative action to remedy the underrepresentation
of attorneys at elite firms, notwithstanding the alleged causes of
that underrepresentation. To situate this claim in the larger debate
over the efficacy of affirmative action, Part III articulates a broad
based defense of affirmative action that is not limited to increasing
the representation of minority lawyers at elite firms.
The first remedy suggested - destabilizing existing racial iden
tities - is my ultimate goal and would obviate the need for affirm
ative action. Realistically, however, affirmative action is the more
likely remedy given the intransigence of racial identification in con
temporary American society and the difficult steps that would have
to be taken in order to successfully destabilize racial identity.
I.

The racial composition of the legal profession and the identifica
tion of which and how many positions minority attorneys occupy
within the legal profession may seem, at first glance, an odd topic to
address. But this point of view demonstrates a problem that is
quite understandable. The reader of this article is no doubt either a
law student, lawyer, or law pro�essor, and in this limited milieu,
lawyers talking to other lawyers or law professors talking to other
law professors, the existence of a nonlegal world in which law plays
a symbolic and real role and in which the racial composition of the
profession is viewed as a barometer of the profession's progress in
racial relations is often ignored. How those outside the legal pro:
fession perceive those within the legal profession is, however, an
·
important component of our legal system.
A.

The Plight of Minorities in the Legal Profession

The numbers are startling and conclusive. Minority attorneys
are underrepresented in prestigious corporate law firms. Before
turning to the numbers, however, it is important to note what this
means for the state of the profession. The paucity of minority attor4. The contention that these results are illegitimate is premised on the notion that there is
no biological distinction between members of different races and that nothing in the way of
intelligence, aptitude, or professional choices is correlated to race or racial identification. See
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 586 (1977) (decrying the fact that race is treated differently
than eye color because people wrongfully associate attributes with one's racial identifica
tion); infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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neys in large corporate law firms is important because of what these
firms represent. The perception within the profession is that these
larger firms represent the elite practitioners of the private practice
bar. Employment by one of these firms indicates that the lawyer so
employed is part of the legal elite.s Moreover these lawyers who
practice in elite firms not only represent the elite of the profession,
to a large degree they control the profession and its development.
What this means for the profession is that, if it is true to its ide
als as the protector and guarantor of individual freedoms and liber
ties,6 then at least minority representation in the elite firms should
be proportional to minority representation in the rest of the profes
sion, unless there is a plausible explanation for their under
representation. In other words, if lawyers are committed to the
advocacy of individual liberties, one would expect them to keep
their own "house" in order. It would be hypocritical for elite law
yers as a group to "talk the talk without walking the walk." It
would also be the height of hypocrisy for them to espouse one set of
ideals while practicing something egregiously different.
Underrepresentation, if demonstrable, means little if it is incon
sequential or if there is a plausible explanation for it. If, for exam
ple, there are fewer minority attorneys practicing in Salt Lake City
than there are in a comparably sized city, little information can be
gleaned from that fact given the lack of minority residents in the
city both to service and from whence to draw potential employees.?
But the numbers do not lie. Minorities historically have been and
continue to be severely underrepresented in these elite firms. In
the most statistically valid survey to date of the career choices that
lawyers make, Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz conclude that

5. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz define elite law firms as the nation's 250
largest law firms based on data supplied by the National Law Journal since 1985. Kornhauser
and Revesz thus correlate size with elite status. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L.
Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role ofRace, Gender, and
Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 829, 851 n.58 (1995).
6. See

infra note 59 and accompanying text for an explication of this thesis.

7. According the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, the total population of Salt
Lake City is 159,936 and the percentage of blacks is 1.7%. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: POPULATION AND
HOUSING CiiARACI'ERISTICS FOR CENSUS TRACKS AND BLOCK NUMBERING AREAS, SALT
LAKE CITY-OGDEN, UT MSA 97 tbl. 8 (1993). According to the U.S. Bureau ofLabor Statis
tics, 123,060,000 members of the civilian noninstitutional population sixteen years old and
over were employed in 1994. Of that total, 821,000 were lawyers. Only 3.3% of the lawyers
were black. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS 175-76 tbl. 11 (1995).
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The [data] show[ ] that in 1981, while African-Americans and Lati
nos were 7.0% of the eligible pool, they constituted only 2.9% of the
associates in elite law firms. This underrepresentation decreased
slightly during the next decade. Between 1981 and 1991, the propor
tion of African-American and Latino associates in elite law firms in
creased by 48.2%. This increase was greater than the increase in the
eligible pool ... which rose only 24.3%. Nonetheless, in 1991,
African-Americans and Latinos were still only 4.3% of associates at
elite law firms, even though they comprised 8.7% of individuals grad
uating from law school between 1984 and 1990.
As in the case of women, the underrepresentation was even
starker among partners. African-Americans and Latinos constituted
only 0.7% of the elite law firm partners in 1981 and 1.7% in 1991.
. . .If the percentage of individuals in these groups among the
attorneys promoted to partner in a given year is lower than their per
centage among associates three to five years earlier, we deem these
groups to be underrepresented among individuals promoted to part
ner. Between 1985 and 1987, 2.1% of new partners were African
American and Latino - a figure lower than the 2.9% of associates in
1981 who were members of these groups. Similarly, between 1987
and 1989, 2.1% of new partners were African-American and Latino,
even though this group comprised 3.1% of associates in.1984. This
pattern was reversed between 1989 and 1991, when African
Americans and Latinos constituted 5.3% of the individuals promoted
to partner, as compared with 3.0% of the associates in 1985.9
Based on their analysis of the data, the authors conclude that
blacks are overrepresented in not-for-profit jobs and considerably
underrepresented in elite law firms, although that underrepresenta8. See Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 5, at 862 tbl. 13. Two facts should be addressed
initially. Kornhauser and Revesz, who employ a rigorous methodology to prove their points,
divide their empirical study into two parts. In the first part, they undertook an empirical
study of the legal profession and the economics of legal education. In the second part of
their article, the authors limit their empirical study to an analysis of the career choices made
by recent law school graduates of New York University Law School and the University of
Michigan Law School, both characterized as having graduates with a wide range of career
options. Id. at 891. Unless otherwise indicated herein, the data referred to are culled from
the first part of the article in which the authors undertake an empirical study of the legal
profession.
Second, the authors define minorities to exclude Asian-Americans for the following
reason:
To perform this analysis [the representation of persons of color in the legal profession],
we have broken these figures down into two groups: (1) Asian Americans and (2)
African Americans and Latinos. In our analysis of job choice in Part III, we group
Asian Americans with whites because of their relatively similar characteristics with re
spect to variables that are relevant to our empirical study, particularly law school per
formance and debt burden. Therefore, the remainder of this section focuses on African
Americans and Latinos.
Id. at 861-62 {footnotes omitted).
9.

Id. at 862-63 {footnotes omitted).
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tion is decreasing in r�cent years.10 More recent data reveal that
the trend the authors noted for the period 1989-1991 was :fleeting
and impermanent. The trend, instead, shows increased minority
hiring at the associate level, but with a significant attrition following
hiring. Hence, current practices continue to produce a minuscule
percentage of minority partners at elite firms.11
Other data support the authors' conclusion that minorities are
underrepresented in elite law firms. In a study of recent Hispanic
Stanford law school graduates, Linda Davila concluded that His
panics were severely underrepresented in the partner and associate
ranks at large corporate firms. 12
Focusing on the plight of black lawyers at elite - defined in this
case as law firms with over 100 lawyers - one commentator suc
cinctly summarized the situation as follows:

There is much clamoring going on about affirmative action in law

firm hiring on law school campuses. Law firm resumes advertise their
10.

See id. at 865.

11. The data support the thesis that minority lawyers are being "churned" through elite
law finns. That is, they are being hired, employed for a few years, and then leaving before
reaching partner.
Despite an increase in minority associate ranks of 38 percent and minority partner ranks
of 45 percent, the percentage of white partners at NU [National Law Journal] 250 firms
dropped only from ':17.6 percent to 97 percent during the past five years. A typical large
firm has 31.8 times more white partners than up through the ranks rarities such as
[African-American partners). Finns in the survey can point with some satisfaction to the
eye-popping percentage increases in total minorities since the last survey.
. . . But such percentages were large because the firms had such a small base of
minority associates to begin with. In addition, the firms can hardly be satisfied with the
attrition these expanded classes suffered. Down the winding road to partnership, young
minority hires are leaving in significant numbers because of burnout, large firm job
hopping, alienation or offers from smaller finns or other job sectors.
The number of minority partners increased just 275 in the past five years, from 614 to
889. Those 275 amounted to only one-ninth of the total number of minority associates in
1991.
While such numbers are embarrassing to firms that want to be known for tolerance
and merit-based hiring, they could result in something worse than bad publicity: They
could cost firms millions of dollars in damages for illegal discrimination. Although the
political tides are apparently turning against affirmative action, some courts are judging
harshly law firms' historically slow progress in promoting minorities.
. , NATL. LJ., Apr. 29, 1996, at Al
Ann Davis, Big Jump in Minority Associates, But
(emphasis added).
.

.

12. Like blacks, Hispanics are woefully underrepresented in elite law finns.
Minority representation in the partner and associate ranks of large corporate law
finns is even more dismal. In particular, Hispanic attorneys are represented in very
small numbers in these firms. For example, in 1982 three-fourths of the nation's largest
finns had no Hispanic partners and more than half of these firms had no Hispanic law
yers at all on their rosters. Although one may be tempted to attribute these figures to
geographic factors, a survey conducted by the National Law Journal found that, in Cali
fornia, which has a larger Hispanic population than any other state, only two of the 530
partners in eight of the largest finns were Hispanic.
Linda E. Davila, The Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attorneys in Corporate Law Firms, 39
STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1406-07 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
·
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efforts to attract minorities, and most law students believe these ad
vertisements.Unfortunately, we should know better than to believe
everything we read. Whether as a result of benign reasons or mali
cious intent, large law firms find themselves at the top of the list of
our nation's most egregious under-achievers in representative hiring
and affirmative action implementation. While many of these firms
advised their clients to hire a more representative group of employ
ees, large law :firms, themselves, made virtually no progress toward
diversifying their own offices. Simply put, the record of the nation's
largest and most prestigious law firms in hiring minority lawyers is
one of continued failure.13
The picture is fairly clear: although the numbers of minority
attorneys are increasing,14 and although their numbers are also in
creasing (although not proportionally) as associates in elite law
firms, they are still underrepresented among the ranks of such law
firms as associates and they are making little or no progress toward
increasing their numbers as partners in these same elite firms.
What does this mean for the profession? It means that a profes
sion that prides itself on promoting equal opportunity under the law
is failing to adhere to its own standards. It means that a profession
that gains prestige and relative preference over other occupations
because of its identification as the promoter and guarantor of civil
liberties will or should be at risk of losing that prestige when the
reality of its abysmal hiring practices is publicized and becomes
well-known to the outside world. It also means that a profession
that is highly selective because of its perceived prestige may soon
lose its advantage over other professions and become comparable
to other well-paying professions like accounting or dentistry, which
provide valuable services to society, but whose adherents are not
regarded as special keepers and defenders of society's norms and
values.
However, before focusing solely on the consequences of the fail
ure to maintain a representative bar, especially in elite firms, and
what can be done to remedy that failure, I first present an exegesis
of how that failure - that dissonance - can occur. It is only when
we grapple with the cause of such an anomalous situation - how it
is that a profession that prides itself on the promotion of liberal
13. Daniel G. Lugo, Don't Believe the Hype: Affirmative Action in Large Law Firms, 11
LAW & INEo. J. 615, 615-16 (1993) (quoting the ABA Commission on Opportunities for
Minorities' denouncement of the legal community for" its failure to give minority lawyers
significant roles in large law firms).
14. In light of recent attacks on affirmative action exemplified by Hopwood v. Texas, 18
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. a. 2581 (1996) and Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38
F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), this trend may be short-lived.
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social causes can itself fall prey to the ills it rails against - that
productive steps can be taken to insure that the legal profession
practices what it preaches.

B.

Traditional Theories Used To Explain the Underrepresentation
of Minority Lawyers
Lawyers gain tangible and intangible benefits as a result of their

perceived role as the protector and guardian of individual and soci
etal liberties.is These benefits accrue both to those lawyers en
gaged in the actual protection and creation of liberties and to those
who have little, if anything, to do with the creation and protection
of liberty. Even private lawyers, normally reviled for their role as
advocates for individual causes,16 gain external and internal re
wards as a result of their positive association with their more altru
istic and public-regarding peers. To the extent these lawyers enjoy
any prestige outside the profession, that prestige accrues as a result
of their membership in what is perceived to be a noble profession.
Similarly, to the extent the attorney's self-image is positive and en
hanced, it is a result of the attorney's internalization of her mem
bership in a noble profession.
The question, of course, is why the ideals that cause these law
yers to be highly regarded by those outside the profession are not
realized within the elite firms that control the bar.17 As one might
imagine, there are a number of alleged reasons for the paucity of
minorities in the elite law firms ranging from the evil - out and out
racism - to the benign - economic factors. These explanations,
however, are unpersuasive.
First, there is no evidence that lawyers are acting in a concerted
racist fashion to minimize the presence of minorities at elite firms.
Indeed, I assume for the sake of argument that lawyers are not dis
ingenuous when they espouse principles of equality, although their
practices result in an underrepresentation of minorities. Quite the
contrary, I take as a given that lawyers actually do believe in the
principles that create the favorable prestige of the profession. That
is what makes the underrepresentation of minorities at these elite
firms so puzzling and enigmatic.
There are other theories that explain the paucity of blacks in
these elite law firms. One commentator, Jerold Auerbach, argues
15.

See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
16.
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that these elite lawyers are representative of the bar to a greater
extent than nonelite lawyers in that these elite lawyers, through
their control of the bar, maintain control over the legal profession
and its development. The fact that these elite lawyers, by defining
qualifications for admission to the bar, serve as gatekeepers to the
profession may in part explain why minorities are underrepresented
in the profession generally as well as in the elite firms.18 Similarly,
Auerbach contends that the elite group has a vested interest in the
maintenance of the status quo which has caused them to structure
the profession in a way that promotes certain political views anti
thetical to their public perception as champions of the poor and
oppressed.19
One oft-stated cause of underrepresentation at elite firms is the
subtle, discriminatory hiring practices allegedly employed at these
firms.20 According to this argument, the requirements that these
firms use to select new members of the firm - stellar grades, law
review membership, a prestigious clerkship - are not bona fide
qualifications for employment at elite firms because they do not
show a correlation between the attainment of these attributes and
success within the firm as a practicing member of the bar. More
over, even if the standards have some validity as screening mecha
nisms to select superior attorneys, they are not uniformly applied,
but instead are waived for whites and applied discriminatorily to
minorities to keep them outside.21 This argument mirrors the "pool
argument" in law teaching - the argument that there are not
enough qualified applicants to fill positions in academe.22
These complaints have merit. Quite persuasive is the argument
that these standards. cannot be employed uniformly or rigorously
given the rate at which large law firms hire and chew up new associ
ates. It would be impossible for the top law firms to replenish their
ranks employing the selective criteria they espouse for their ideal
hire.23
18. See JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JusnCE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
MODERN AMERICA 4 (1976).

IN

19. See id. at 4-5.
20. See Lugo, supra note 13, at 624-30.
21. See id. at 627.
22. For a recitation of this argument, see Vance Knapp & Bonnie Kae Grover, Can the
Corporate Law Firm Achieve Diversity?, NBA NATL. B. AssN. MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 8,
17-18.
23. As firms have grown exponentially, even the most elite firms have had to widen their
nets to catch and hire neophyte lawyers who do not meet their traditional hiring
requirements.
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But these initial entry barrier requirements, however rigorously
employed by elite law firms, cannot explain fully the paucity of mi
norities in elite firms, especially at the partnership level. Any com
plaint about hiring standards addresses only the entry barrier to
being hired at a particular firm. It does not address the more prob
lematic phenomenon of why minority attorneys hired as associates
are not promoted to partner at the same rate as their white counter
parts. It cannot adequately explain what is happening to minority
attorneys once they have crossed the threshold and entered the
world of the elite firm.
Any theory that attempts to explain the reasons for the under
representation of minorities in elite firms must address not only en
try barriers, but what happens to minorities who successfully enter
the profession at the elite level but do not make it through the pipe
line to the rank of equity partner. This lacuna is especially troub
ling given the assumption that partners and others are not
consciously acting in a racist or discriminatory fashion in their pro
motion decisions.
Another alleged cause of the underrepresentation of minorities
in private or elite law firms is the history of discrimination that
these groups have received in the legal profession.24 The theory is
It is a mathematical impossibility for all persons hired by large law firms to measure
up to their so-called hiring criteria. By definition of the percentages, there just are not
enough people in the top 10% or 25% of the class to fill the hiring needs of all large law
firms. In fact, after bids have been made for the top 10% of students at the top 20 law
schools, thousands upon thousands of hiring decisions are made by hundreds of law
firms. For the purposes of this article, large law firms have been defined as those firms
that employ over 100 attorneys. In the U.S., there are 319 of these large law firms. If we
estimate, on a low-average, that each of these firms will hire 10 new attorneys each year,
we find that the large law firm group will hire approximately 3,190 new attorneys per
year. Now, compare this to the number of top 25% law students available from the
campuses of the top 25 law schools in the nation. Roughly, the average size of a class at
a top 25 law school is approximately 305 students. Therefore, there are approximately
1,900 students in the top 25% of the class at the top 25 law schools. Clearly, there is a
discrepancy, a discrepancy of over 1,000 jobs.
Lugo, supra note 13, at 626-27 (footnotes omitted).
24. Even though constitutional and other public interest lawyers have been in the fore
front in fighting for equal rights for minorities, it is no doubt true that a significant percent
age of lawyers,.equal to their layperson counterparts, are hostile or apathetic to the plight of
minorities in society.
Minorities have been able to gain limited access to the legal community but have never
been welcomed wholeheartedly into the profession. Even those minority students who
negotiate the [barriers to entry] face additional barri,ers once inside. White law profes
sors often perceive minorities as less qualified than majority students and therefore have
lower expectations for them. These messages are quickly perceived by students, with
each group acting out their prescribed role. Studies show that in an environment where
minorities are expected to perform above average and are encouraged, students have the
confidence to succeed and are more likely to be in the top of their class. Unfortunately,
those environments are rare. Moreover, even when minorities are able to survive law
school and its discouraging atmosphere, the prospects for employment in private prac
tice are sorely limited.
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that the lingering effects of past racism creates the underrepresenta
tion that persists in the elite firms today. Once again, although this
theory has merit, it cannot explain satisfactorily why minorities are,
to a certain degree, hired at a disproportionately high rate - over
represented at the point of entry into elite firms25 - but neverthe
less

are

severely

underrepresented

when

the

promotion

to

partnership decision is made. One would assume that the effects of
racism, whatever their present impact, would be constant at the
point of entry as well as at the time for promotion. Indeed, com
mon sense leads me to assert that once the entry barrier is over
come, as it has been, the, historical legacy of racism also has been
overcome to a large degree and should not reappear at some subse
quent point unless there are other unique factors at work in the
legal profession that would explain why firms can hire but not pro
mote these same minorities proportionately.26
Others have advanced the counterintuitive argument that the
environment at corporate law firms is not conducive to the promo
tion of minorities because affirmative action has resulted in the
abandonment of objective standards.27 The thesis is that affirm a
tive action has resulted in the hiring of minority candidates who are
not as well-qualified as their white peers. The corollary argument is
that even those minority hires who are as well qualified as their
white peers are penalized through the operation of affirmative ac
tion because those whites in power positions assume that any mi
nority hired is an affirmative action product.28
One can challenge the assumption that there is indeed a, mer
itocracy at work in the hiring and promotion of minorities. More
importantly, this argument must be rejected because even though it
Knapp & Grover, supra note

22, at 9 (footnotes omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
26. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (asserting a theory of group dynamics
25.

and affiliations which may satisfactorily explain why minorities are hired proportionately but
not promoted proportionately).

27. See, e.g., Knapp & Grover, supra note 22, at 16.
28. Aside from admitting that whites act in a racist fashion, that is, that whites are unable
to judge minorities individually and instead stereotype them on the basis of skin color which in a perverse way defeats the argument that there is no need for affirmative action this argument is specious because it assumes that merit cannot be evaluated fairly or success
fully within the firm and that the firm uses a proxy, in this case racial identification, in order
to award promotions. For an examination of how firms monitor and promote associates, see
Kevin A. Kordana, Note, Law Firms and Associate Careers: Tournament Theory Versus the
Production-Imperative Mode� 104 YALE LJ. 1907 (1995). Of course, this argument that af
firmative action hurts the minority who does not need affirmative action is not novel to hiring
and promotion decisions made by elite law firms. Professor Stephen Carter espouses the
same view in his book, STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLEcnoNs OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AcnoN
BABY 47-62 (1991).
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does provide a rationale for why minorities are hired - affirmative
action - but then not promoted - affirmative action once again the argument is seriously flawed in that it ultimately rej ects the very
notion of meritocracy that it attempts to embrace. It assumes that
in a world without affirmative action, firms can make unbiased hir
ing decisions based on the qualifications of those in the pool. How
ever, the argument assumes that the same merit-driven standard
cannot be employed at the time of promotion to differentiate be
tween those whose performance merits promotion and those whose
performance does not merit promotion. The argument also suffers
because it assumes that race affects decisions only at the time of
promotion and not at the time of hire and thereafter.29
Another recent theory put forth to explain underrepresentation
in partnership is that minorities and women, since they were the

most recent to break the ranks of large law firms, are natural (and

nondiscriminatory) targets for layoffs and terminations when the
legal economy sours.30 This sort of "last-hired, first-fired" theory
would have merit if those employed were engaged in an occupation
in which seniority rules were adhered to formally or as a matter of
custom or practice. Unfortunately, no evidence supports that view,
and the empirical evidence, that minorities are hired at a rate that
exceeds their percentage in the appropriate eligible population,31
belies the theory that the economy has resulted in the deflation of
minority attorneys since the workforce is neither shrinking nor re
maining constant.
A related argument is that the recent innovation of nonequity
partners has had a disproportionate effect on minorities because of
their relatively recent entry into the profession.32 Although there
29.

See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.

30. In many professions and industries, it is often the last hired that is first fired.

There is concern that the troubled economy will further hinder the retention and
progress of women and minority attorneys. Because a large percentage of the female
and non-white attorneys have been hired in the past five years, they may be affected
disproportionately by the layoffs caused by the recession.
Valerie A. Fontaine, Cultivating a Diverse Workforce, NATL. LJ., Jan. 10, 1994, at 25.
31.

See supra text accompanying note 9.

32. It is interesting to note that as the bar's membership has become more diverse, tradi

tional hiring and promotion practices have become destabilized, thus placing new entrants in
less satisfactory career paths while protecting those "senior" partners who benefitted from
the exclusively white, male domain at the time of their hire.
Large firms may also have the worry that courts and others may inquire into exactly
what the term "partner" means. For the first time, this year's NL! [National Law Jour
nal] survey documented disparities in race and gender between equity and non-equity
partners. Not only do black, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans comprise a small
slice of large-firm lawyers, the tiny minorities who make partner do so in name only.
Based on a breakdown given by some 60 firms of their equity and non-equity part
ners, the survey found that 46.2 percent of all minority partners were the non-equity
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has been no empirical evidence to prove or disprove this thesis, an
ecdotal evidence does not support it.33 Furthermore, the empirical
data assembled and addressed herein, which was collected for the
time period preceding the adoption of two-tiered partnerships
tracks, similarly provides no support.
Another economic argument for the underrepresentation of mi
norities in elite firms, especially at the partnership level, is the as
sertion that an essential part of the partner's job description is to be
a "rainmaker," that is, to attract paying clients who can provide
enough work for the partner and the associates necessary to sup
port the partner's salary.34 The claim is that minorities have a
harder time attracting clients because of their minority status and
the majority (white racial) status of most of the sought-after
clientele.

Some literature suggests that Hispanics also face greater difficult get
ting clients.Bringing in business may be harder for Hispanics for sev
eral reasons. Clients generally make contact with lawyers in social
circles, and because Hispanics are often excluded from these circles,
they have fewer opportunities to make the contacts. Also, some law
yers feel that because they are Hispanic, the general public questions
their legal skills and qualifications and, therefore, fails to seek them
out as legal counselors when the need arises.53
This assertion ignores two facts. First, many elite firms have in
stitutional clients whose interests are served by partners selected by
the firm. Although at one point some "rainmaker" partner may
have generated the association with the firm, that rainmaker may
be retired or deceased. However, the client remains with the firm
variety. Such partners draw salaries rather than sharing in firm profits. By contrast,
only 30 percent of all white partners are non-equity.
The discrepancies can be explained in part by the youth of . . . minority partners. The
two-tiered partnership is a relatively new invention that came into vogue in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Minorities and women, the subjects of more recent recruitment,
are likely to be in the younger ranks of lawyers in large firms. They therefore are more
likely to fall into the recently created non-equity tiers.
Davis, supra note 11, at A21.
33. TYpical is the following sort of allegation:
Several minorities interviewed for this article . . . insisted that they hadn't seen black
or Hispanic colleagues jump straight from associate to equity partner the way white
lawyers had. "You get a promotion which, to the outside world, would look like a really
positive move," says a black attorney at Katten [Muchin & Zavis, a firm that had a 2.5
million dollar judgment for race discrimination entered against it for failing to promote a
black associate in March 1996,] who asked not to be identified. "But there are huge
discrepancies [in salary and clout] between income and equity partners."
Katten reported four minority non-equity partners and one equity partner. White
partners are split roughly 1-to-1 between the two tiers.

Id.

34.

See generally Kordana, supra note 28, at 1924 (describing tasks of law firm associates).
supra note 12, at 1418 (footnotes omitted).

35. Davila,
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and the firm selects the attorneys, including the partner, who will
work with the institutional client. Hence, many firms are selecting
which partners work with which clients and the firms are failing to
assign these clients to minorities.36
More importantly, the assertion that minorities are unable to act
as successful rainmakers ignores the increasing diversity of Ameri
can society which will produce a minority-majority workforce
within the next century.37 Indeed, the pressure is on in the legal
profession in general, and elite law firms in particular, by govern
mental and private entities to increase their hiring of minority law
yers in order to retain the business they have.38
Another alleged reason for underrepresentation - especially in
nonentry-level positions - is said to be minority attorneys' lack of
comfort in these firms as a result of a hostile environment created
by, among other things, a lack of mentors.39 It is quite plausible
36. One minority partner at a prominent firm comments on the paucity of minority attor
neys who service institutional clients: "Sidley's Mr. Jones says minorities are unlikely to in
herit the institutional clients of the firm unless the clients insist that their matters be staffed
by a diverse team of lawyers. 'Shame is not something that is likely to motivate law firms.
Profits do,' he says." Davis, supra note 11, at A25.
37. As two commentators have noted:
Law firms should hire more minority attorneys, of course, out of simple justice. But
powerful economic reasons exist as well: The U.S. Census estimates that by the year
2000, eighty percent of the U.S. work force will consist of minorities, women or immi
grants. A business that focuses solely on hiring white males will find them in short sup
ply. Minorities are assuming positions of authority in politics and corporations. The
number of African-Americans holding elective office, for example, increased from 1,469
in 1970 to 5,606 in 1983.
Knapp & Grover, supra note 22, at 17 (citations omitted); see also Lugo, supra note 13, at
634.
38. If the firms will not take the initiative in using minority lawyers to service corporate
clients, perhaps the impetus to employ minority lawyers must come from the clients.
According to the ABA Journal, the American Bar Association Minorities Commission
has enlisted the assistance of corporate counsel at leading companies to inform firms
that they want minority attorneys to work on their matters - thus helping to destroy the
myth that corporate clients do not want to be represented by minority lawyers. These
corporate counsel also have written letters to their outside law firms urging the hiring
and promotion of minorities.
In addition, the federal government has established quotas for a certain amount of its
work to be given to minority and female-owned firms. This policy has led to a number
of "joint ventures" between majority-owned law firms and female- or minority-owned
firms.
Fontaine, supra note 30, at 27.
39. See Davila, supra note 12, at 1417 ("Isolation may be enhanced by a lack of Hispanic
mentors. Mentors serve as role models and advisors, and many attorneys feel that the lack of
minority mentors injures their progress with the firm.") (footnote omitted). Knapp and
Grover comment that:
Progress for minorities at corporate law firms has been slow. As A.J. Cooper, Jr., a
partner in a Washington, D.C. law firm, National Bar Association Associate General
Counsel and past president of the National Conference of Mayors, put it: "Law firms
are among the most segregated institutions in America
The Senate Judiciary Com
mittee should not be asking judicial candidates if they belong to a segregated golf club,
but whether they belong to a segregated law firm."
.

•

•

•
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that the lack of minority role models has a negative impact on mi
norities' progress within elite firms. But there are three problems
with this theory. First, white women, who were once as excluded
from these firms as minorities, have made significant progress in
achieving partnership rank within these firms even though they
faced the same lack of mentoring.4o
Second, assuming that the argument has merit, it is unclear what
can be done to resolve the problem short of simply promoting or
hiring minorities as partners to serve as role models for those young
associates who are entering practice in these elite firms. The prob
lem, of course, is that if these lawyers are promoted or hired as
partners without the requisite experience, they cannot truly serve as
role models since they would have no base of information or exper
iences upon which to draw to advise their younger peers. Hence
the role model argument fails to answer the question of what can be
done to increase the number of minorities within these elite firms.
Third, there is something slightly odious about the claim that
only minority attorneys can mentor other minority attorneys or
that, similarly, only women can mentor other women. That sort of
stereotyping, although consistent with human proclivities and cur
rent patterns of behavior, may be unproductive in the long run be
cause instead of promoting equality and harmonious race relations,
it assumes whites remain with whites and blacks with blacks. One
theme of this article is that lessons imparted from Critical Race
Theory demonstrate how to break down these racial barriers in or
der to eliminate racism and the subjugation of minorities.41
One interesting claim that has been made recently is that minor
ities may not be proportionately represented at elite law firms,
either in entry-level or nonentry-level positions, because they
choose not to work for predominantly white firms. Commentators

The environment for attorneys in corporate law firms is often chilly, an extension of
the subtle and not so subtle racism minorities face in law school.
Knapp & Grover, supra note 22, at 16 (footnote omitted). Another commentator observes
that:
The lack of role models often is cited as a critical reason for the underrepresentation of
women and minorities in the profession. A firm can help create positive role models by
placing female attorneys and attorneys of color in high-visibility and influential roles
within management. Mentoring is an effective strategy toward fostering role models.
Fontaine, supra note 30, at 27.
40. Women are also underrepresented in the partnership ranks of large law firms but they
fare better than blacks and other minorities. By one count, women make up 13% of the
partners at large law firms. See Note, Why Law Firms Cannot Afford to Maintain the
Mommy Track, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1375 (1996).
41.

See infra Part III.
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have characterized this phenomenon as "mutual deselection" in
that the firms do not choose minority attorneys and qualified mi
nority attorneys choose not to work for elite firms.42
This assertion is as yet unsupported by empirical evidence. Fur
thermore, the thesis has explanatory power only if it is assumed that
minorities have the option, the choice to go or not to go to these
elite firms. That assumption, however, is contradicted by some of
the earlier theories which place the blame for the underrepresenta
tion of minorities in elite firms squarely on the shoulders of the
firms.43 Nevertheless if the thesis is correct, even only in part, it
raises questions about why ethnic or racial status is perceived as a
barrier at white firms - why minorities choose not to work at these
firms, and what can be done to eliminate that deselection in order
to increase that representation. More particularly, it is unclear how
attorneys, white and black, can maintain the desire to work in envi
ronments in which the other attorneys look like themselves, even
though they truthfully believe in their roles as protectors and guar
antors of equal opportunity and individual social liberties in Ameri
can society.
Another theory used to explain the underrepresentation of mi
norities in elite firms at the partnership level relies on the notion of
unconscious racism.44 This theory, although no doubt true, is a
42. As Davila notes:
Another commentator, Ed Cray, asserts that "assimilation of minority lawyers into
prestigious firms has been slowed by mutual deselection." Cray uses this term to de
scribe the phenomenon created by the tendency of minorities to choose to work where
ethnic status is not perceived as a barrier and the tendency of lawyers in law firms to
select attorneys "like themselves." When faced with a choice of assimilation with a
white-dominated, establishment firm or separatism with a "hardy band of brothers,"
Cray asserts that a minority lawyer may be strongly motivated to go where he will not
risk rejection by mere virtue of being different and will not have to cope with the daily
pressure of being the Hispanic in the office. Cray surmises that these factors have com
pelled minorities to choose other career options. Minority firms may be smaller and pay
less, but Hispanics "know they are welcome there." This process of mutual deselection
has, of course, led to fewer minorities moving into established corporate law fir ms.
Davila, supra note 12, at 1414 (footnotes omitted) (citing to Ed Cray, Blacks and Browns in
Blue Chip Firms, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1984, at 35).
43. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
44. One survey reveals the problems faced by Hispanic attorneys in corporate firms:
[T]he major obstacle Hispanics face within corporate law firms is overcoming percep
tions. Thirty percent of the Hispanic respondents stated that a presumption exists that
Hispanics are not qualified. this belief was reinforced by the fact that various nonHis
panics, at firms with no Hispanic attorneys, responded that Hispanic attorneys probably
face a problem in their ability to communicate due to deficiencies in the English lan
guage. This preconception is likely to occur because, as one respondent said, "Many
minorities carry the extra baggage of racial stigma. That is, many colleagues assume that
minorities get their jobs primarily because they're minorities." Another commented,
"[There exist] distorted perceptions and misplaced generalities about Latino articulate
ness, intelligence, work ethics, etc."
Davila, supra note 12, at 1420-21 (footnotes omitted).
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rather broad, catch-all argument, in which minority attorneys are
allegedly at a disadvantage when compared to their white counter
parts due to the omnipresent effects of racism. Hence, unconscious
racism is usually cited when the allegation is made that white law
yers do not socialize with minority attorneys or expose them in so
cial settings to their white clients.45 Once again, however, the
problem with relying on covert or subconscious racism as the ex
planatory cause of the underrepresentation of minorities is that
although it makes perfectly legitimate sense to assume that attor
neys, like other members of society, may act in a racist fashion due
to either conscious or subconscious motivations, it fails to explain
the dissonance that results when it is assumed that lawyers, unlike
other citizens, .are committed to the eradication of racism and the
establishment of true equality in American society in which race is
as irrelevant as eye color.46
Moreover, a failure to comprehend how this discordant situa
tion could arise and be maintained is ultimately destructive of any
attempt to remedy the problem. It is only when the cause of the
problem is identified that a solution can be proposed. The disso
nance between the ideals espoused and, I am willing to concede,
actually and truly believed by lawyers, and the reality of the manner
in which they recruit and promote their younger colleagues, must
be traced to the one fact that is implicit in all of the above explana
tions for the underrepresentation of minorities in elite firms: the
lawyer is not only a member of a learned profession, the lawyer is
also a member of larger society. Until that nested relationship is
exposed and explored, little can be done to achieve proportional
representation of minority lawyers with.in the elite law firms in our
society both at the time of hire and at the time of promotiop..
C.

The Janus-Faced Nature of the Legal Profession

How lawyers and the legal profession are perceived by the pub
lic is important for two reasons, one external, the other internal.
The public's perception of lawyers and the legal system they pro45. As one commentator noted, the social barriers to meaningful integration still exist in
large firms:
A black partner who recently left one Wall Street firm for an even bigger one says he
felt like a pariah at his former firm. Not once in his two years there did his partners
invite him to their homes, though socializing was common. At first, the lawyer, who
asked not to be identified, waited to be asked. As the months passed, he felt too awk
ward to take the lead and invite them to his home.
Davis, supra note 11, at A21-25.
46.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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duce and regulate is important for common sense reasons having to
do with the legitimacy that will be afforded to the system. My thesis
is quite simple: Law and the legal system will not be respected or
obeyed if the proponents of such a system are viewed as less than
capable, honest, forthright, and intelligent individuals.47 If those
producing the laws - be it the legislature or the judges - and
those most intimately familiar with its day to day machinations lawyers - are viewed as knaves or fools by those external to the
system, the power and force of the law likewise will be diminished.
Similarly, if the law appears to be a tool or instrument that can
be used to achieve certain societal goals (a phenomenon I have
characterized elsewhere as the "adaptive preference" model of
law48), its force as such a tool or instrument is largely dependent on
the authoritative nature of the entity wielding the tool or instru
ment. The persuasive power of law as a tool to change or eliminate
certain harmful or nonproductive behavior must, in part, be attribu
table to the respect and acquiescence afforded to the law and law
yers by those subject to it. It is illogical to assume that our legal
system, which relies largely on voluntary compliance,49 dismisses
those who are viewed as gatekeepers to the system as mere charla
tans and quacks not worthy of considerable respect and envy.
Hence, the development of law and its practice as a noble profes
sion rather than as a trade or occupation.so
This is not to say that lawyers' reputation is without blemish.
Although the legal system may have progressed from a trade or
occupation to a noble profession, entry into which its members
pride themselves for accomplishing,s1 it is also clear that a signifi47. I am not so naive as to ignore the fact that lawyers are often derided as money grub
bing opportunists whose elimination from society would benefit society. Hence, the oft
repeated aim of Shakespeare's Dick the Butcher: "the first thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4,
sc.2. Indeed, recent public opinion polls can be used to support the proposition that lawyers
occupy one of the most hated and despised professions and are among the most untrustwor
thy individuals in our society. See Matthew Kauffman, Spirit of Lawyer Gags Have Some

Attorneys Feeling Glum. How Many lawyer Jokes Does It Take to Upset a Lawyer? Do You
Care?, HARTFORD CouRANT, Jan. 3, 1994, at Al ("Public-opinion polls show lawyers consist
ently sharing the cellar with such long-reviled professions as funeral directors, used-car salesmen and . . . journalists.").
.
48. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 1630-32.
49. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551 (1992) ("There is a common under
standing that most people obey the law even when they disapprove of it.").
50. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
1850s To THE 1980s, at 3-10 (1983) (detailing the legal profession's evolution from a
trade to a noble and highly regarded profession).

THE

51. For further discussion of how lawyers view their role within the legal system and the
benefits they obtain therefrom, see infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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cant percentage of those outside ·the legal profession view lawyers
as dishonest opportunists at best, and as crooks at worst, who are
willing to sell their souls (if not a near and dear relative) to the devil
himself for the almighty dollar.52 In this role, lawyers are seen as
occupying not the noblest profession, but the oldest profession as 'individuals who will prostitute themselves or their . ideals for the
coin of the reaJm.53
What I find illuminating is how both visions of lawyers can be
maintained simultaneously by a large segment of society. And here
I do not refer to a phenomenon in which one's own individual law
yer is viewed as revered and the opponent's is reviled. Quite the
contrary, I refer to a situation in which individuals maintain dichot
omous opinions of lawyers in which they consistently believe that
lawyers benefit society while at the same time holding the view that
lawyers are harmful and destructive to society - a view epitomized
by the lawyer jokes which seem endemic in contemporary society.54
The solution to the mystery of how lawyers can be both simulta
neously revered and reviled is found in how the public perceives
lawyers in their disparate roles. Lawyers, it is safe to assert, wear
many hats. In one capacity, that which I will sfmplify and character
ize as "private," lawyers represent individuals or entities either in
negotiations or in litigious circumstances. In this private role, the
lawyer acts as an advocate, not for a cause, but for a client with
52. See Max Boot, Rein in Robin Hood, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1995, at A16; see also
Thomas W. Overton, Lawyers, Light Bulbs, and Dead Snakes: The Lawyer Joke as Societal
Text, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1069 (1995); Janet Dunphy, Lawyers; Their Profession Remains

Largely Misunderstood, They Say, Creating a Love - Hate Relationship With the Public,

VmGINIA-PILOT, Nov. 7, 1994, (Business Weekly), at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Papers File; Matthew Hall, Lawyers: People the Public Loves to Hate, BusINESS Fmsr CoLuMBus, Nov. 15, 1993, § 1, at 17; Some Good Lawyer News, BosroN HERALD, Mar. 9,
1996, at 012.
53. See Daniel J. Komstein, The Devil and the American Lawyer, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1994,
at 2; see also Vanessa Alexander, Pro bono Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1990, at A2; Joe Fitzger
ald, No Doubt About It: Simpson Has No Sense ofDecency, BosroN HERALD, Nov. 2, 1995,
at A4; Dick Polman, Three-Dimensional Pictures ofNixon the Man, THE RECORD, Nov. 27,
1989, at B3.
54. Here's a lawyer joke with which most should be familiar and I provide it because it
demonstrates the spirit of the public's view of lawyers. "Question: What do you call 100
lawyers at the bottom of the sea? Answer: A good start." The fact that there exists several
Internet addresses which are maintained as a repository of lawyer jokes is further indicia of
the public reputation of lawyers. A partial list of those addresses, as of December 1996,
follows:
Lawyer Jokes (last modified Nov. 12, 1996) <http://rever.nmsu.edu/-ras/lawyer.shtml;
Lawyer Jokes <http://www.cs.vu.nl/-fmdvries/lawyer.html;
Lawyer Jokes <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/People/dougb/duff/115.html>
Lawyer Jokes <http://www.ifi.uio.no/-thomabe/text/lawyerjokes.html; and
Canonical List of Lawyer Jokes <http://fub46.zedat.fu-berlin.de:8080/-stummel/
LAWYER_JOKES.html>.
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respect to a specific issue. In this capacity, the lawyer must serve as
a zealot for her client by doing all that is ethically permissible to
insure that her client's point of view prevails.ss This is the situation
or position that lawyers occupy when they are reviled: the lawyer
who zealously advocates a run of the mill divorce case in which no
quarter is given, no opportunity for attack spared; the criminal law
yer who manipulates the system to achieve the release of his client,
notwithstanding public perception that the client is guilty; and the
overreaching advocate who discovers and exploits every loophole in
the system or in a contract.s6
One concrete situation demonstrates my point. For years law
yers have contended that real estate brokers and others, including
title insurers and banks, have engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law when they assist buyers and sellers in the purchase and sale
of real property.s1 Indeed, the American Bar Association has
weighed in with its view that lawyers should be employed in real
estate transactions to fill in mundane documents such as contracts
for sale and deeds and that to allow brokers to accomplish the same
represents the unauthorized practice of law.ss What the debate ob
scures is the public's preference to exclude lawyers from this trans
action and to rely on laypersons to complete the most complicated,
expensive and important financial investment of their lives. My
opinion is that this preference stems from the view that lawyers act
ing as lawyers inevitably complicate deals because of their combat55. "As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Preamble at 5 (1995). Any
attempt to give an all inclusive detailed list of the situations in which individuals normally
seek counsel would be exhausting, if not impossible. Suffice it to say, most people will seek
legal representation, indeed, would be viewed as abnormal if they failed to do so, in situa
tions ranging from the mundane - when buying a house, seeking a divorce, probating a will,
pursuing a tort claim following an automobile action and filing for bankruptcy - to what
some would view as extreme - being charged with a crime. I call this "extreme" because
when one thinks of the typical situations requiring a lawyer, there is an element of choice
involved, whereas most individuals charged with crimes and requiring legal counsel would
prefer not to be in those situations to begin with. But perhaps being charged with a crime is
not as extreme a situation as it once was, since by recent reports three out of every 100
Americans is either in jail, or on probation, or has some other connection with the criminal
legal system. See David Nyhan, Our Lock-'em-up Attitude is Breaking the Bank, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 12, 1996, at A17.
56. See Mike Tolson, Attorney Fees: How Much is Too Much? Judge Expected to Rule on
Lawyers Claim to Eyebrow-Raising Sum, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1996, at A13.
57. See, e.g., GRANT s. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 267-72 (4th ed. 1992),
58. See Special Committee on Residential Real Estate Transactions, American Bar Asso
ciation, Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Lawyer's Proper Role-Services-Compensa
tion, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 581, 594 {1979).
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ive nature or, failing that, charge exorbitantly for the rendition of
mundane services.
Compare, however, when the lawyer is viewed as an advocate
for a cause or an issue and not for an individual. It is in this capac
ity as the guardian and protector of individual freedoms and civil
liberties that the lawyer is revered.59 The lawyer, in what I charac
terize as her "public" persona, is not viewed as a rent-seeking op
portunist. What separates the reviled private lawyer and the
revered public lawyer is the nature of the client and the services
provided. The public lawyer's client, even if localized in one indi
vidual representative of a larger group, is society. The spillover ef
fect of that client's representation, be it a test case, a class action, or
the advocacy of new laws that initially benefits only one client, rep
resents the focal point of the lawyer's advocacy. The lawyer seeks
to benefit a class or group in society whose harm cannot be reme
died through individual lawsuits. Conversely, the private attorney's
sole point of advocacy is the interest of one client or group to the
exclusion of the interests of other groups or individuals. If external
individuals are benefitted, so be it, but external benefits or benefi
ciaries are not the objective of the private attorney acting as an ad
vocate for a private litigant.
Externally, then, lawyers may be considered Janus-like when
viewed by the public. On the one hand, when acting for private
interests, lawyers are vilified and excoriated as hired guns willing to
do whatever is necessary to achieve success short of committing
crimes and ethical violations. On the other, lawyers are revered as
champions of causes that benefit the· public through the creation
and protection of rights and liberal social issues. What does this
59. I willingly concede that not all in the public or not even all lawyers are in favor of the
creation and expansion of all civil liberties or the promulgation of liberal social issues. No
doubt, segregationist lawyers and others viewed those lawyers pushing for the adoption and
expansion of civil rights laws as wrongheaded fools. A modem analogy involves the legality
of same-sex marriages with some attorneys and academes in favor, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO C!vJ:LIZED
COMMITMENT {1996), and others opposed, see Same Sex Marriage, HAw. BJ., Feb. 1995, at
48; Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26-38 (arguing that there is no constitutional right to same-sex marriage).
The point is that although the issues are divisive, the lawyer's role in either supporting or
opposing those issues is not. That is what lawyers are supposed to do. Hence the rise of
conservative public interest lawyers like those employed by the American Enterprise Insti
tute or the Rutherford Institute for Religious Freedom who believe that they too are fighting
the good fight to preserve the morals and political integrity of American society. Conse
quently, although the focus of this portion of the article is on lawyers who espouse what are
perceived to be liberal causes, one should not lose sight of the fact that the same position can
be taken for those lawyers who argue for the contraction of such rights as advocates in the
public arena.
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dual perception mean for lawyers? It means that lawyers can in
ternalize the positives associated with their profession and distance
themselves from the negatives associated with the private actions of
lawyers. Lawyers can, to some extent, enjoy the trappings of public
virtue and the notion that they produce public goods, and hence
shield themselves from scrutiny as they ply their trade as private
lawyers.
More importantly, it means that lawyers create a positive self
image, internalized even by those acting for private clients, that
they are perpetually fighting the good fight. That private lawyers,
even if engaged in the nefarious private transactions that create ill
repute, consider themselves members of a nobler profession, where
that profession must in the service of its clientele per its cannons act
in a fashion that produces revulsion on the part of the public,
speaks to the power of lawyers' reputations as guardians of liberty.
Lawyers, I contend, internalize the dichotomous perception of their
profession in order to gain prestige, or if you will, preference over
others in society. That is, lawyers gain positive benefits from those
outside the legal profession as a result of public perception that
lawyers are employed in a noble profession in which ideals and
principles are prized over money and win and loss records.
IL

A. How Lawyers Produce Status
In

a recent article60 Professor Richard McAdams makes a com
pelling argument that individuals are motivated to achieve both ma
terial gains and immaterial gains such as status, prestige and
distinction, not only in absolute terms, but also to an extent greater
than their peers.61 In addition, he sets out the concept of relative
preferences - a concept that is important to understanding the
benefits that fl.ow from the dichotomous reputation of lawyers. In
deed, this article contends that lawyers as a group are able to avoid
the negatives associated with the private practice of law and instead
See McAdams, Relative Preferences, supra note 2, at 3.
Professor McAdams's theory of relative preferences focuses on one's position vis-1'1vis one's peer group.
But the thesis of this Article is that behaviors such as these [a mother's attempt to ar
range for the death of her daughter's rival for selection to the cheerleading squad and
the fact that in Japan a significant number of individuals work themselves to death] are
related, and reveal an important and often-neglected aspect of human motivation. In
both cases, the psychologically richer description is that the actors seek not an absolute
end, but relative position among peers
60.
61.

Id.

•

.

.

.
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gain prestige and preference over other groups and occupations by
identifying with the positive attributes of the subgroup I call public
lawyers.

A comparative analysis buttresses the thesis I have put forth. It
is mystifying to some that our society has so many lawyers when
other societies by comparison have so few. The growth of the
American legal profession is phenomenal when compared to that of
other societies.62 In Japan, for example, there are only approxi
mately 13,000 lawyers in an highly industrialized and modernized
society that is viewed as economically comparable to the American
economy.63 And although there are many reasons for the large
number of lawyers in the United States, ranging from the mundane
- increases in the financial return on a legal education ,relative to
the return on a college education - to the admirable - the in
crease of women in the workforce and the concomitant increase of
women in the legal profession64 - and the small number in other
industrialized societies like Japan - a different cultural milieu in
which conflict is avoided and viewed negatively - I contend one
often overlooked justification for the disparity in the numbers of
lawyers as a percentage of population is directly attributable to the
prestige associated with the occupation of lawyer in the different
societies.
In the United States, due to its heterogeneous and pluralistic
culture and history, lawyers promote themselves as guardians of
freedom and liberty, as noble servants to the "Law" with a capital
"L," in order to obscure the negative reputational effects of the
profession, and in order to gain prestige in society relative to other
62. On the growth of the American legal profession, one commentator has noted:
Since World War II, the legal profession has grown not only in absolute numbers but
also relative to the population as a whole and in terms of value added to the gross do
mestic product. The number of lawyers in the United States grew from about 222,000 in
1950, to 286,000 in 1960, to 355,000 in 1971, to 542,000 in 1980, and to 806,000 in
1991. . . .
The ratio of lawyers to the population of the United States also increased markedly.
Between 1950 and 1991, the numbers of lawyers almost quadrupled, but the size of the
population did not even double. Thus, while there was one lawyer for every 679 people
in 1950, by 1991 this ratio stood at one lawyer for every 313 people. Moreover, the share
of gross national income attributable to private legal services tripled in four decades. It
rose from 0.47% in 1950 to 0.52% in 1960, 0.65% in 1970, 0.81 % in 1980, and 1.43% in
1991.
Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 5, at 835-37 {footnotes omitted).
63. Kenneth L. Port reports that "there are about 650,000 licensed lawyers in the United
States and only about 13,000 bengoshi (licensed litigators) in Japan." KENNETII L. PORT,
CoMPARATIVE LAw: LAW AND 1HE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 285 {1996).
64. Both theories, the mundane and the sublime, are put forth in Kornhauser & Revesz,
supra note 5, at 837-38.
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professions or occupations.65 This contention, which represents an
extension of Professor McAdams's theory, merits further discussion
in two respects. First, I have focused on lawyers' efforts vis-a-vis
other groups to attain nonmaterial benefits, even though discus
sions of relative preferences usually focus on an individual's con
sumption of a material good relative to others' consumption of the
same good.66 Second, I have focused on the group's production of
status vis-a-vis other occupations, instead of individual
consumption.
Addressing the latter point first, groups are the perfect reser
voirs for the production of status or self-esteem, that is prestige.
And it is one's membership in a group that serves as a focal point in
the thesis of relative preferences.

The ubiquity of social groups says something of their importance:
groups include not just firms, trade associations, and families, but
groups based on demographic traits such as race, gender, or age, and
those based on membership, such as [membership in a state or local
bar association,] fraternities or sororities, amateur sports teams,
gangs, the Rotary or Elks Clubs, or private lunch clubs. Undoubt
edly, some or all of these groups, like the firm, serve the individual's
interest by minimizing the transaction costs she incurs while acting to
satisfy her preference for whatever interest or function the group fa
cilitates. . . . My thesis is that a material view of human motivation
underestimates both the level of cooperation that groups elicit from
their members and the level of conflict that groups elicit from each
other. A single group dynamic connects these added increments of
cooperation and conflict: groups achieve solidarity and elicit loyalty
beyond what economic analysis conventionally predicts, but solidarity
65. According to Professor McAdams the attainment of status or prestige is an end that
individuals seek:
Whether it is termed "status," "prestige," or "distinction," people sometimes seek
as an end in itself - relative position; they measure their income against the prevailing
"standard of living" of their society or their peers, suffer indignity at failing to "keep up
with the Joneses," and generally gain or lose satisfaction according to how well they do
compared to others. . . . Much less has been said about the extent to which preferences
are negatively interdependent, and the economic consequences of such preferences. One
way that preferences may be negatively interdependent is when a person seeks as an end
a position that is relatively superior to that held by others.
McAdams, Relative Preferences, supra note 2, at 3 (footnote omitted).
66. Professor McAdams provides a synopsis of his thesis on negative relative preferences.
[T]his Article addresses negative relative preferences - preferences for approaching
or surpassing the consumption level of others. These preferences are relative because
their satisfaction depends on the ratio of SC [selfish consumption - one's own con
sumption] to OC [others' consumption or the average of several others]; the preferences
are negative because, within this ratio, their satisfaction varies inversely with OC. A
negative relative preference is therefore a preference for a consumptive position that is
favorable in comparison to that of others. "Consumptive position" may refer to the
quantity or the quality of particular goods, including intangible goods such as prestige, or
it may refer to the sum of all goods, i.e., wealth. The "others" may include an individual,
a group, or all of society.
Id. at 9.
-
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and loyalty within groups lead predictably, if not inevitably, to compe
tition and conflict between groups. The connection is the desire for
esteem or status. Groups use intra-group status rewards as a non
material means of gaining material sacrifice from members, but the
attendant desire for inter-group status causes inter-group conflict.
67
As to the first point, Judge Posner has demonstrated that "repu
tation" is a valuable right worthy of production and protection once
established:

Reputation - the opinion others hold of one as a candidate for busi
ness or social transactions - has important economic functions in a
market system, indeed in any system where voluntary interactions are
important. It reduces the search costs of buyers and sellers and
makes it easier for the superior producer to increase his sales relative
to those of inferior ones.In these ways it helps channel resources into
their most valuable employments - a process at the heart of the mar
ket system.This role is not limited to explicit markets. It is just as
vital to the functioning of the "marriage market," the market in
friends, the political market, and so on.68
Lawyers who are not engaged in that aspect of the practice from
which public beneficence and rewards flow are nevertheless able to
free ride on the positive reputation engendered by those lawyers
engaged in this highly regarded segment of practice. Second, and
just as importantly, lawyers also internalize the positive attributes
associated with their more revered peers 'who ·work in the' public
interest and convince themselves that they are likewise engaged in a
noble pursuit within a noble profession, even if that pursuit is only
the venal pursuit of cash. Indeed, there may be a cyclical effect
such that society places value on the public perception that lawyers
are members of a noble profession (rather than a trade), which re
sults in lawyers being paid a premium when they perform mundane
legal services as opposed to work involving the pursuit or protec
tion of liberty and freedom.
Consequently, one can make a credible argument that lawyers,
those practicing in the public and in the private sphere, gain bene
fits, material and nonmaterial, from the perception that lawyers are
members of a noble profession that zealously guards and protects
equality and individual freedoms. As guardians of these individual
liberties, lawyers receive a reputational premium that may explain,
in part, why bright young people flock to the profession.69 If that is
indeed the case, imagine the consequences that would flow from
67. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1007 (footnotes omitted).
68. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMicS OF JusnCE 287,(1981) (footnotes omitted).
69. See supra note 64-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons why an
increased percentage of the population continues to choose law as a profession.
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the assertion, if proved, that lawyers, instead of protectors and
guarantors of equality and individual freedoms, are defilers of those
very ideals in their day-to-day practice.
B.

Why Minorities Are Underrepresented in the Legal Profession:
The Effects of Membership in Multiple Groups

I have addressed previously the notion that lawyers gain some
prestige, some preference, over members of other occupations due
to their adherence to liberal social causes and the public perception
that lawyers, when acting in the public sphere, are worthy of respect
and prestige as guardians of liberty and equality.70 What I ignored
then and will address now are the two negative side effects of that
gioup affiliation. First, implied as part of the theory of relative
preferences is the notion that there are multiple subgroups compet
ing for prestige within the larger group and that the competition
among these subgroups inevitably leads to conflict. Second, and
more important, is the notion that one can belong to multiple
groups and that membership in one group does not necessarily
eradicate the conflicts that arise as a result of one's membership in
other groups. Each point will be addressed in tum.
As indicated above, Richard McAdams has developed a theory
that attempts to explain how prestige is created through the opera
tion of relative preferences. Integral to his theory is the notion that
groups form and generate esteem and social status among their
members which induces members to make contributions to the
groups' welfare, and that this intragroup cooperation, secured
through the production of esteem, leads to intergroup conflict.71
The notion that lawyers are members of multiple groups is integral
to my thesis that lawyers have failed to integrate their profession
successfully, at least as it pertains to elite firms. An individual law
yer's membership in multiple groups creates conflict between the
positive ideals she espouses that produce the relative preferences
and the benefits she gains as a member of one favored group - the
bar - and her membership in yet another dominant (favored)
group, the white racial majority, which gains esteem and relative
preference by subordinating minority group members in society.
Before I can explicate this thesis, however, a brief synopsis of Pro
fessor McAdams theofy is necessary.
70. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
71. See McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1019-33.

February 1997]

Legal Profession

1031

I start with the presumption, as does Professor McAdams, that
groups emerge or form based on viable distinctions that are self
generated and policed by the groups. In other words, neither I nor
Professor McAdams puts forth a thesis explaining why and how cer
tain groups form or emerge and are subsequently distinguished
from other groups.72 We take as a given that certain groups exist,
and are recognized and distinguishable. Moreover, although Pro
fessor McAdams focused on racial groups and the conflict gener
ated thereby, I also am going to take as a given that an individual's
occupation can and does identify the individual as a member of a
group comprised of all those who are members of that occupation.73
In this context, I assume throughout that the bar is a trade associa
tion that is identified as a group both by its members and by those
external to the group, and that this group "serve[s] the individual's
interest by minimizing the transaction costs she incurs while acting
to satisfy her preference for whatever interest or function the gro11p
facilitates."74
What is addressed more fully herein is how membership in a
group like the bar induces the cooperation that produces the es
teem that members in the group seek from other members in the
group and those external to the group and how that production of
esteem leads to conflict with members of other groups. Following
that I will address one issue that is not a focal point of :Professor
McAdams's article: the theory that one can belong to multiple
groups that overlap and that this multiple membership in groups
can lead to intra- and intergroup conflict. I contend that an
individual, a lawyer, can belong to multiple groups consistent with

his or her persona and that these multiple group affiliations,
although not personally destructive, can cause the individual who is
the member of one group to slight members internal to that group
72. For example, although Professor McAdams's article addresses the intergroup conflict
that results from group identification and membership based on racial identification, see id. at
1033-84, he makes no attempt to explain how it has come to pass that individuals identify and
group themselves according to visible characteristics such as the amount of melanin in their
skin, the texture of their hair, the size of the nostrils of the nose, and so on. Anthony Appiah
characterizes these observable physical characteristics as the "grosser morphology" of an in
dividual, see KWAME .ANniONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PH:!Loso
PHY OF CuLTURE 36-37 (1993). Nor does McAdams state whether that is a rational basis to
form groups. In a similar vein, I make the argument that the existing structure of racial
identification is largely an historical accident that should be jettisoned in favor of ethnic
identification that has more meaningful characteristics. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabi·
lizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 887, 910 & n.89 {1996).
73. See supra text accompanying note 67.
74. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1007.
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to gain self-esteem from those members in a dominant, overlapping
group. In essence, I propose a hierarchical view of group affiliation
or membership. Within this hierarchical framework, an individual's
membership and allegiance to one group may be trumped or ne
gated by the membership in another group, although this individ
ual's dual membership status does not have the effect of negating
the subordinate's group membership and identification.75
At base, Professor McAdams's theory is that individuals within
a group produce status for their group's members by discriminating
against members of other groups.76 In race relations that is a fairly
easy concept to comprehend. In this society, with our racial history,
Professor McAdams' theory is epitomized by the idea that whites
discriminate against blacks and other persons of color in order to
gain prestige or esteem as whites and in order to feel superior to
those "other" persons of color.77 However, the concept of status
production and intergroup discrimination is somewhat harder to
comprehend when referring to attorneys as the constituents of the
group who gain prestige by practicing discrimination. A few exam
ples should suffice.
Lawyers discriminate against nonlawyers in many different
ways. Lawyers discriminate most obviously through the licensing
requirement that allows one to enter into the trade or practice of
law. That licensing requirement, which gives to lawyers the exclu
sive right to practice law in a given geographical region, discrimi
nates against nonlawyers by precluding their performance of
services that are deemed included in the practice of law.1s More
over, lawyers are the only individuals who may represent other in
dividuals in a court of law. Lawyers, of course, are also the only
individuals who may join a bar or other trade association to which
access to services and information is provided.79 In a myriad of dif75. What I mean by this last phrase is that, except on the margins with individuals who
pass, one can cannot be a member, in this society, of both the white and black race. The two
are deemed to be mutually exclusive groups. For a discussion of "passing" in which individu·
als who would be racially classified as black under the "one drop of blood rule" pass for
white because they are viewed phenotypically as white, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709 (1993).
76. See McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1007.
77. See id. at 1044-63.
78. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion between lawyers and
realtors regarding the unauthorized practice of law as it pertains to the provision of services
associated with a purchase and sale of a residential dwelling. Lawyers themselves are prohib
ited from assisting with the unauthorized practice of law by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1995).
79. To become an attorney member of the ABA, one must graduate from an ABA ap
proved school and be sworn in as a member of either a state bar or a bar of one of the
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ferent ways, lawyers are treated differently, that is, positively, when
compared to their nonlawyer peers.80 This exclusive license to par
take of certain societal privileges, to represent others, to appear in
court, and to become a member of the local bar association, clothes
lawyers with a distinction that discriminates against nonlawyers.
Although there are many reasons, valid and invalid, why attorneys
have these exclusive privileges, one reason has to be the production
of self-esteem or status among the members of the profession. To
allow anyone to perform the task that only lawyers are allowed to
perform may have many consequences, but one certain conse
quence would be the reduction in the prestige associated with the
profession.
Consequently, although this is not the place to play out this de
bate in its entirety, one can argue that the bar examination and li
censing requirements associated with the practice of law should be
abolished. If those who acquire unique knowledge by attending
three years of law school and passing a two or three day test admin
istered by the state or some other entity is a sign of competence or
superior ability, then the market should reflect these preferred at
tributes irrespective of a licensing requirement; savvy individuals
would seek out those other individuals who possess the necessary
qualifications when needed. For certain matters that are deemed
legal - filling out a purchase and sale contract or a deed in a typi
cal residential real estate transaction - the individual desiring the
service may feel a realtor or third party can provide the service just
as efficaciously, but at a lower price. Hence, there is a plausible
argument that the market can successfully regulate the practice of
law and that no external forces are needed to create entry
barriers.81
territories of the United States. See Telephone Interview with John Moore, Member-Services
of the American Bar Association (Jan. 17, 1997).

80. This, of course, does not mean that individuals cannot provide legal services for them
selves. It is quite common for an individual to represent herself in any number of different
transactions, ranging from the common to the extreme, that could call for the retention of a
lawyer. However, it is important to note that only lawyers can represent other persons.
Hence, a spouse cannot represent a spouse in a trial setting no matter how closely aligned the
spouses' interests are. Similarly, a nonlawyer parent cannot represent a child no matter how
close the relationship.
81. The counter-argument is that those consumers of services, the lay public, are either
too stupid, too lazy, or too shortsighted to do their homework with respect to the provider of
these services and that the regulator - the bar examiners - serves as a guarantor of the
minimum threshold for the quality of services provided. Again, this is not the place to re
hearse this debate, but I cannot resist noting that that rationale is both over and underinclu
sive. It is overinclusive to the extent that it includes all legal services no matter the
complexity. Hence, the debate over the unauthorized practice of law with respect to real
estate agents. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. It is underinclusive to the ex-
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But these entry barriers do exist and result in discrimination
against those who are nonlawyers. More important for the purpose
of this article and Professor McAdams's theory, this discrimination
does produce status for members of the profession. Lawyers' uni
queness, their unique ability to practice law and represent others,
has created a prestige, a panache of power, intelligence, and suave
ness - some would say bordering on unctuousness - that is not
found in any other profession. I could point to many examples of
the public's perception of lawyers that support my position that
lawyers are viewed as occupying an elite, prestigious position,82 but
one recent article in the popular press sufficiently exemplifies this
point metaphorically. In the article, the author compares the pub
lic's perception of ospreys to its perception of bald eagles, after os
preys attacked and almost killed a bald eagle that President Clinton
had released on the Fourth of July as a symbol of the nation's envi
ronmental purity and national renewal:

Ospreys are the bikers of the bird world - essentially blue-collar
outlaws with attitude. From their punk-rock head plumage to their
merciless working hours to their low-rent housing on bell buoys,
channel markers and other rarely private waterfront locales, they
nurse and display a certain avian resentment.
Bald eagles, on the other hand, are the lawyers of the bird world.
They dress in power tones, build ostentatious nests, strike pretentious
tent that the bar examiners typically provide entry barriers only and do not continue to test
the competence of the provider of services once entry is gained. One can quibble about the
effect of the recent movement to impose continuing legal education (CLE) requirements on
attorneys through the Bar Association, but no one would argue seriously that this sort of
requirement ensures that the public is provided with competent service from wise
practitioners.
Another common argument related to the one just discussed is that the cost of letting the
market operate in this area is too high. That is, the error costs associated with selecting a
competent individual are too great. An individual may not be able to tell whether he or she
has selected a competent practitioner until it is too late, until the damage is done. Given the
rise in malpractice litigation and the dissatisfaction with lawyers generally, I am not sure a
regime in which individuals must take that risk is any worse. See Johnathan M. Epstein, The
In-House Ethics Advisor: Practical Benefits for the Modem Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL Ern1cs 1011, 1012 (1994) ("In addition, in recent years, the legal profession has seen a growth in
the number and size of awards for legal malpractice."); RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M.
SMrrn, LEGAL MALPRACilCE § 1.6 (4th ed. 1996) (setting out statistical data concerning the
increases in malpractice claims and awards). In fact, a case could be made that licensing
requirements provide a safe haven for incompetents and reduces the due diligence that
would otherwise be undertaken by the unsuspecting public if they knew how little being
licensed means when correlated with competency to perform a given task. In effect, the bar
examiners and other requirements may have created a world in which those with the where
withal to investigate, hire, and monitor competent attorneys do so, and those without, lulled
into complacency as a result of the erroneous belief that "licensed" equals competent, take
their chances.
82. See Kenneth Anderson, A New Class ofLawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96
CoLUM. L. REY. 1062, 1066 (1996).
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poses and spend much of their lives stealing fish caught by other
birds, frequently ospreys.
83
What is interesting is how the lawyer's exclusive control of legal
matters, and hence the prestige generated by that status, is main
tained in a world in which someone who has attended law school
and passed the bar examination could easily transmit information
to nonlawyers to enable those nonlawyers to represent themselves.
In other words, since we allow individuals to represent themselves
in just about every facet of what is considered legal representation,
it is unclear how lawyers have maintained a monopoly over the de
livery of those services to the public. Why hasn't the market oper
ated to convey the information from the experts, the lawyers, to the
lay public? Indeed, if the public realized how mundane and simple
many legal tasks are - for example, the preparation of documents
for a real-estate closing84 - they would demand that lawyers re
duce the exorbitant fees they charge to handle these tasks.85
More important, why don't lawyers take advantage of their
unique position and knowledge of the routine nature of certain
transactions by notifying the public of that aspect? Better yet, why
doesn't an individual attorney profit from that knowledge by, for
example, setting up a nationwide network of paralegals, all of
whom do the routine legal work under the attorney's supervision,
to evade the bar's restriction on the unauthorized practice of law?
Assuming the attorney is licensed in each state and does not run
afoul of any ethical or other restriction, why doesn't the lawyer
maximize her profit by providing cut-rate legal services when the
services of a trained lawyer truly are not required?B6
83. Ken Ringle, The Surly Bird - Ospreys, Tops in Nature's Talon Show, WASH. PosT,
July 9, 1996, at Cl.
84. In many states, such as Virginia, it is common practice for these tasks, including the
title search, to be performed by a paralegal, not a lawyer. Yet the paralegal can provide these
services only through a lawyer. She cannot hang out a shingle on her own because that
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text. See generally Roger C. Cramton, Delivery ofLegal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 531, 573 (1994) (discussing the use of paralegals by firms operating a
high volume practice in such areas as real estate closings); Dale H. Seamans, "Do-It-Your
self' Lawyering; The Bar Debates How to Respond to Companies Engaging in the "Unautho
rized Practice" ofLaw, MASs. L. WKLY., July 15, 1996, at Bl (discussing lack of clarity in the
term "unauthorized practice of law").
85. Indeed, the battle between the bar and realtors over their respective roles in the real
estate closing is a product of the public's dissatisfaction and fear of lawyers.
86. Of course, this type of challenge to the ethos of the profession has happened to some
degree already. The rise of firms such as Jacoby & Meyers, which provide law services to the
masses, is an example of the delivery of legal services of the type I describe. See Edward
Felsenthal, Hard to Do: The Messiest Divorce That Jacoby & Meyers Ever Handled: Its Own,
WAu.. ST. J., Jan. 23, 1996, at Al; Randy Kennedy, Changes for Jacoby, Meyers, L.A. DAILY
NEws, May 14, 1995, at B3. Similarly, the creation and popularity of Nolo Press, which pro-
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More generally, why do lawyers adhere to standards promul
gated by state bar associations regarding the practice of law that
limit their opportunity to maximize their wealth through multiple
representation,87 solicitation,88 and the generation of legal work
product by unsupervised individuals?89 The question is even more
intriguing when one recognizes that it is lawyers, not the public,
who impose limits on their own ability to generate the maximum
number of benefits as a result of their knowledge of the law. Law
yers, through either the bar association, the supreme court of the
state in which the lawyer is admitted, or a combination of both,
control both the entry and activities of the profession's
practitioners.
Although it is difficult to think of a historically established
group like lawyers as having a collective action problem since their
practices are so ingrained in society that they seem "normal," in a
society in which the lawyer's monopoly over the delivery of services
did not exist one could hypothesize a collective action problem in
getting those with legal expertise to deliver their services according
to the rules of a restrictive bar.9° Even in a world in which restric
tive rules are already established, collective action problems
abound. There are many situations in which selfish but rational be
havior by the individual lawyer would, if undertaken collectively by
all or most lawyers, lead to suboptimal collective outcomes - even
tually, perhaps, the elimination of lawyers and lawyering as a
profession.
What precludes this disastrous outcome - the destruction of
the prestige that is associated with the group through the destruc
tion of the group - is the production of intragroup status. As indi
cated above, lawyers gain status, or prestige, relative to other
vides legal documents drafted by lawyers to laypersons with instructions on how to prepare
simple documents such as wills and deeds, is testament to this trend. For an example of what
Nolo Press offers, see <http://www.nolo.com/>.
87. Multiple representation is prohibited in many cases by the Model Rules of Profes
sional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995).

88. Direct solicitation is limited by the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1995).
89. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct outline the responsibilities of nonlawyer
assistants. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1995).
90. "Collective action problem" is a term used by game theorists to describe the difficul
ties groups face in procuring the cooperation of their members. "In contrast to Adam
Smith's 'invisible hand,' which guides society to desirable outcomes though individuals are
selfishly motivated, game theory describes 'collective action problems' - situations in which
individually rational decisions lead to sub-optimal collective outcomes." McAdams, Coopera
tion and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1009 (citations omitted).
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groups as a result of their membership in the group.91 That type of
prestige or status can be characterized as "external-regarding" pres
tige, or status that is relative to other groups. In addition, this
external-regarding prestige adheres to and is uniformly applied to
all members of the group without discrimination. Thus, there is a
minimal amount of prestige accorded to each lawyer simply as a
result of that individual's status as a lawyer. But what allows for the
creation ofthe group and its maintenance, notwithstanding collec
tive action problems, is a form of internal or intragroup prestige,
referred to as "esteem" to differentiate it from the external-regard
ing prestige accorded to lawyers as a group. Internal esteem builds
upon the external prestige that -lawyers, within and without the pub
lic sphere, internalize as part of their reputational persona.92
As Professor McAdams notes:
If neither material self-interest nor altruism explains the residuum
of cooperation, what can? ... [I]ndividuals behave selfishly, not altru
istically, but their selfish end is the production of the non-material
good of esteem. If individuals seek such non-material ends, members
of social groups have another means of solving collective action
problems, by allocating esteem to induce members to make contribu
tions to the group welfare. Once we add esteem consequences to the
material payoffs of individual decisions in such settings, we can ex
plain both the fact and the nature of residual cooperation .
.. .Individuals derive status from groups in two ways: first, indi
viduals gain esteem from strangers based on visible group member
ships; and second, within a socially connected group, individuals are
especially concerned with the esteem of fellow members. In each
case, though for different reasons, status production creates a non
material incentive for group cooperation.
93
The puzzle, given the existence of intragroup cooperation that
produces esteem for members of the socially connected group, is
how racial discrimination can exist within the group of lawyers who
gain prestige externally from their reputation as defenders of lib
erty and equality. Assuming lawyers are not being venal or disin
genuous with respect to their adherence to these ideals, why hasn't
intragroup cooperation led to the eradication of racism within elite
firms of the profession? That is, if lawyers truly believe in the prin
ciples they espouse, and those principles result in the creation of a
reputation that is positive relative to other professions, would not
these same lawyers internalize the benefits that accrue as result of
91. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
93. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1019.
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that reputation and reward those within the group who adhere to
those principles with even more esteem? Is it not contradictory to
discover that instead of being the most successful practitioners of
the principles espoused, elite firms are the worst adherents? What
causes this divergence? Indeed, one can argue that additional es
teem is allocated to elite firms as a result of the paucity of minority
lawyers at those firms, even though this paucity contradicts their
public perception as adherents to equality and liberty.
The confusion is resolved when we recognize that individuals,
even lawyers, belong to multiple groups and gain both intra- and
intergroup status as a result of the multiple memberships. The puz
zle of the paucity of minority lawyers at elite firms is explained by
the intersection of two memberships by those individuals in power
at elite firms: membership in the profession and membership in ra
cial groups. A white lawyer at an elite firm, although a lawyer with
all of its attendant consequences, is still white, and in this society,
given our shared history and conceptions, one's membership in a
racial group usually trumps one's identification or membership in
the occupational group of practicing lawyers.
Although lawyers gain status relative to other occupations in so
ciety because of their reputation as protectors and guardians of so
cial and individual liberties, and, indeed, reward with intragroup
status those who make sacrifices on behalf of the group and in
crease the group's welfare within larger society - that is, those who
forego high income positions within the profession to promote the
image of lawyers as protectors and guardians of social and
individual liberties94 - predictably there remains intergroup com94. Given space constraints, I have given short shrift Professor McAdams's exploration of
why individuals make material sacrifices on behalf of the group to gain self.esteem and why
individuals within the group concomitantly reward those individuals with esteem. However,
for those interested in a thorough exegesis of this point, see McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict, supra note 3, at 1023-29. My precise point as it applies to lawyers is that lawyers
who perform pro bonowork or who actually work in what I have characterized as the "public
sphere" to protect social and individual freedoms are highly regarded within the social group
of lawyers and are compensated, not through dollars - those engaged in this sort of work
are among the lowest paid lawyers, see Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 5, at 865-74 - but
through these intragroup esteem payments. For example, Elaine Jones of the NAACP or
noted late civil rights attorney William Kunstler receive great respect within the profession
and some of that respect has to be generated as a result of these intragroup esteem payments.
See Richette L. Haywood, CBCF Convenes 26th Annual Legislative Conference in Nation's
Capita� JET, Sept 30 1996, at 4 (describing conference by Congressional Black Caucus Foun
dation); Carrie Johnson, Honors and Appointments, LEGAL TTh1ES, Oct. 7, 1996, at 17 (noting
that Elaine Jones, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, was presented
with the George W. Collins Award by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation and also
received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Harvard University); William Kunst/er,
Radical Lawyer, Dies, INTL. HERALD TRIB., Sept. 6, 1995 (contending that William Kunstler's
"admirers" saw him as "a brilliant lawyer, and a skillful and courageous litigator, while his
critics saw him as a showoff and publicity seeker"). Indeed, the allure of pro bono work for
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petition among occupations which causes lawyers to raise their
prestige by lowering the prestige of other groups or occupations.95
This theory of intragroup rewards and intergroup competition re
flects the conflict that occurs when one is simultaneously a member
of a group - lawyers - that gains esteem through the promotion
of ideals and principles and a member of another constituent group
- white males - that holds ideals and principles antithetical to the
first group. In that situation, I hypothesize that the individual may
espouse one thing in one group in order to gain esteem and espouse
something completely different in the other group. Moreover,
when the actor who is a member of multiple subgroups is faced with
these conflicting principles, I likewise hypothesize that because it is
more difficult to do and not do the same act simultaneously, that
although principles and ideals may be articulated, those principles
and ideals may not be acted upon if that action causes a greater loss
in esteem in one group - white males -. than a gain in another
group - lawyers.
Professor McAdam.s's thesis on group cooperation works opti
mally when an individual can only be a member of one relatively
homogenous group.96 When that assumption is relaxed, however,
students may be attributable in part to the esteem payments these jobs produce vis-a-vis
corporate or law firm jobs whic)l Jack such esteem. One anecdotal point may demonstrate
this point more clearly. I have a former student who left his well-paying partnership job in a
relatively large law firm in a large city to become a general district court judge, taking a
tremendous pay cut, during the prime of his career. In other words, this was not a case of
attorney burn-out or semi-retirement. When I asked my former student how he could walk
away from something he has worked so hard to construct, his response was the pride and
honor his colleagues bestowed upon him when he was nominated to become a judge and how
that distinguished him from the other attorneys and partners in the firm he left. According to
my former student, it made the opportunity to serve the public too great to pass up. See also
Ken Myers, Despite Debt and Lure ofFirms, Pro Bono Work is Catching On, NATL. L.J., Oct.
16, 1995, at Al8; Travis E. Poling, Legal Aid: Pro-Bono Services in Greater Demand Than
Ever, SAN ANTONIO Bus. J., Feb. 17, 1995; at Al.

95. See McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1031-32.
96. Professor McAdams recognizes that one can belong to an. occupational group and

achieve status through that occupational group even though race is typically the most observ
able and visible characteristic one first observes and uses to categorize:
Indeed, intra-group esteem production, and social norms based on such esteem, may
provide the only explanations for the success of very large groups in lobbying despite
powerful incentives to free-ride. Judge Richard Posner has conceded some uncertainty,
for example, in explaining how farmers cooperate in legislative activities. I propose that
the answer is the same for farmers as it is for the ranchers Ellickson studied in Shasta
County. Although the occupational status of farmers or ranchers is not as observable as,
for example, their race, it is one of the first things strangers detect about them. And
within a geographic area, farmers and ranchers tend to be socially connected. Thus,
farmers and ranchers have an interest in the status generally accorded their occupation
and a means of inducing contributions to that status. Intra-group esteem allocation elic
its material contributions to group material welfare, such as monetary contributions to
lobbying efforts.
Id. at 1030 (footnotes omitted).
·
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not only is intergroup competition increased, but the theory of
intragroup cooperation must internalize the reality of multiple
memberships insofar as multiple memberships affect the attainment
of and the reward for intragroup status.
To some extent, the creation of many heterogeneous groups to
which members simultaneously belong may go a long way to ex
plaining something, that, at first glance, seems hypocritical - the
articulation of one set of beliefs alongside a hiring practice that rin
dermines those beliefs. But if lawyers do not correct these contra
dictory positions, they ultimately will lose the group status they gain
as a result of their reputational cache as protectors and guardians of
individual and social liberties.97
Professor McAdams does not ignore the fact that one can be
long to many different groups simultaneously, a concept that he
characterizes as "cross-membership" in groups.9s One premise put
forth as the basis for antidiscrimination law is to increase the inci
dence of cross-memberships which will allegedly result in less racial
discrimination:

Laws forbidding race discrimination may increase the occurrence
of cross-membership and thereby undermine the effectiveness of ra
cial subordination as a status strategy. Race has been and remains
highly correlated with other demographic factors. If a white in
dividual lives in an all-white neighborhood, attends an all-white
school, works in an all-white firm, worships at an all-white church,
belongs to an all-white amateur sports league, and patronizes all
white hobby clubs, she will never face the problem of cross-member
ship. If, however, anti-discrimination laws were to integrate neigh
borhoods, schools, firms, and private clubs, more whites would find
themselves in a position in which racial minorities belong to some of
their groups.Consequently, racial subordination would lower the sta
tus of these integrated groups.One response will be for whites to flee
the groups that become integrated, but if the costs are too high, as
when the law integrates a number of social groups at the same time,
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
98. Professor McAdams notes that an individual's membership in multiple groups lessens

97.

the investment in status production that creates discrimination:
[A]�ti-discrimination laws may lower the investment in status confiscation by increasing
the incidence of "cross-membership." Ceteris paribus, an individual prefers subordinat
ing a group to which she does not belong to subordinating a group to which she does
belong. An individual always bears a cost from subordination of her own group and that
cost gives her an incentive to avoid such behavior. In fact, an individual who is a mem
ber of group A and group B might find it in her interest to invest in efforts to prevent
members of group A seeking to subordinate group B. Therefore, the more "cross
membership" between two groups, the fewer the resources that will be invested by the
two groups in subordinating each other.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1080 (footnotes omitted).
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the effect might be to lower the effectiveness of racial subordination
as a status strategy for many whites.99
What should be added, however, is the effect of cross-member
ship when the principles and ideals espoused by the multiple groups
are inconsistent, opposite, or divergent. Instead of hypothesizing a
lessening of racial subordination as a result .�f cross-membership a plausible outcome for some members of the dominant racial
group
I predict a possible alternate outcome: the articulation of
a set of views and ideals consistent with one group'� (lawyers') ide
als and principles (the furtherance of individual and social liberties)
and the maintenance of a reality (the racial composition of the pro
fession) that is largely consistent with and is reflective of the other
group's (whites') ideals and principles. Such a state of affairs may
represent a natural stage of development in which cross-member
ship presents an individual with two competing sets of beliefs and
ideals, one that is historically dominant and relatively fixed and one
that is either relatively recent or, more important, societally
subordinated - the paradigm of racial equality. What this means is
that one's racial identification, clearly more visible and more de
fined in this society,100 currently dominates in most contexts for
most people over one's identification and group affiliation based on
occupation.101
-

Thus, if the cross-membership in groups produces conflicting
principles or ideals, a resolution that falls short of the eradication of
the conflicting principle or ideal would be the sublimation of the
conflicting principle or ideal in a way that most efficaciously creates
99. Id.
100. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 72, at 911

(describing how visible morphology is commonly used to stereotype people).

101. McAdams provides the following explanation of why race and racial identification is
a predominant group as it pertains to status production:
Only visible distinctions affect the level of esteem one receives from strangers. Con
sequently, individuals care greatly about the status associated with their visible charac
teristics. To produce status, one can invest in acquiring visible traits that others consider
desirable, or one can invest in making others consider one's existing visible traits desir
able. One may pursue this latter strategy directly, by accumulating accomplishments
that enhance the trait's status, or indirectly, by lowering the status accorded the traits of
others. When members of a group pursue the indirect production strategy of lowering
the status accorded other traits, they engage in "discrimination."
Race defines a "shared-trait" group because it is constructed around observable
traits. Race discrimination is thus a means by which people who share certain roughly
similar and observable traits that come to be known as "race" produce social status for
themselves. Status production does not explain why the particular visible characteristics
we associate with race become important to status production, but once they are salient,
the theory explains why they remain important. Not only do people compete for esteem
by investing in subordination of previously defined groups, but people invest in preserv
ing group boundaries to maintain their position in a high-status group.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 3, at 1045 (footnotes omitted).
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status for the individual situated in the multiple groups. Indeed,
this could be the optimal strategy from an efficiency standpoint
when ideals are in flux and there is no consensus within the more
dominant group to obviate principles that conflict with principles
generated by the other groups to which its members may belong.
This sort of cognitive dissonance occurs in other settings and
there is no reason to believe that it does not occur with attorneys
who espouse one thing, yet do another. For example, elsewhere I
have described the cognitive dissonance that occurs when a black
male does not conform to the stereotypes associated with him.102 If
a black male is a rather meek and ineffectual looking academic who
teaches law, that individual is "fenced off" from the rest of black
society and the stereotypes associated with black society so that
those very stereotypes may be maintained in the face of this con
flicting data.103
The challenge, then, once the conundrum is explained, is to
hasten cross-membership \vith the concomitant reduction or elimi
nation of racial subordination as a status strategy for white lawyers
who gain benefits from their position as lawyers championing egali
tarian ideals, while consciously or subconsciously maintaining the
racial status quo by failing to hire and promote minority lawyers
proportionate to their representation in the bar. I now turn to two
strategies, both of which originated from and find credence in criti
cal race theory: the "equality of result model," 104 which can be
used to remedy the deleterious situation in which attorneys find
themselves; and the "destabilizing of racial identity model,"1 05

which, if achieved, can eliminate existing racial identities and any
impermissible benefits that flow from existing patterns of racial
domination.
III.
Part III turns to remedies for the underrepresentation of minor
ities in elite firms, which assume that that underrepresentation is
due in large part to the lawyer's membership in multiple groups,
which causes lawyers to adhere to one set of principles - the pro
motion of racial superiority based on skin color - to the detriment
of other oft-espoused principles such as the promotion of equality
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Johnson, supra note 72, at 923-24.
See id. at 924.
See infra notes 136-68 and accompanying text.
See infra section III.A.
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and social liberties. One remedy is to require the legal profession
to take the affirmative steps it has imposed on other groups in soci
ety to correct the racial imbalance that exists in elite :firms - in
other words, affirmative action. Consequently, I present a philo
sophical justification for the use of affirmative action in the legal
profession that focuses on the equality of result rather than equality
of opportunity.106
The use of affirmative action to alleviate the underrepresenta
tion of minority attorneys in elite firms is not necessarily new or
innovative, and, although I am a staunch advocate of affirmative
action - having gone so far as to advocate the use of quotas in
certain situations107 - I have recently concluded that for polit
ica110s and jurisprudential reasons,109 affirmative action has a lim
ited chance of succeeding in the current climate in which whites
view any gains by minorities, and particularly blacks, as a zero-sum

game in which they are the losers. 110

Affirmative action was never intended as a permanent solution
to this society's racial ills. Affirmative action is best viewed as a
transitory vehicle that ultimately becomes unnecessary with the
106. See infra section III.A. It should be noted that this focus on equality of result rather
than equality of opportunity is indeed a central tenet of critical race theory. In particular, see
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1381-84 (1984).
107. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action:
Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. Iu L. REv. 1043.
..

108. One particularly egregious case of race-baiting occurred when Jesse Helms used
affirmative action to appeal to racial fears during the 1990 U.S. Senate race in North Carolina
in which he defeated a black Democratic challenger, Harvey Gantt. See Eleanor Clift, 'Go
ing for the Gut': How Ads Play on Race, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 24, 24-25. A more
recent example of a white Republican trying to make political hay by playing the race card
occurred when Governor Pete Wilson of California entered the 1996 political race for the
Republican nomination for President and used as the centerpiece of his campaign the elimi
nation of affirmative action in California. See Marc Cooper, Making Waves for a Wilson
Wipeout, THE NATION, Sept. 18, 1995, at 266; John Harwood, California Republicans Debate
the Pros and Cons of Targeting Immigrants and Preference in Fa/� WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1996,
at A20 (discussing Pete Wilson's appeal to "angry white males"); Philip J. Trounstine, Affirm
ative-Action Rebuke Boosts Wilson, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 5, 1995, at B6. Similarly,
the Governor's political ally, Ward Connerly, a black man who is a University of California
Regent, led the recent effort to enact a new provision of the California Constitution that
outlaws the use of affirmative action in the state. This amendment was passed by the voters
on November 5, 1996. See CAL. CONST. art 1, §31. (forbidding racial preferences by any
state entity, except where mandated by federal law, including state institutions of higher
education).
109. The Supreme Court recently struck down predominantly minority voting districts in
Texas. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1950-51 (1996) (holding unconstitutional two
predominantly African-American and one predominantly Hispanic voting districts). Affirm
ative action and the use of race in any jurisprudential context also suffered a setback in
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
110. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 855, 858 (1995) (discussing political trends unsympathetic to affirmative action).

Michigan Law Review

1044

[Vol. 95:1005

passage of time.111 This has caused me to search for a p ermanent
solution to America's racial problems. The recent colorblind juris
prudence emanating from the Supreme Court and other courts has
lead me to consider a novel approach to eliminating the under
representation of minority attorneys in elite firms: the eradication
of existing racial identities based on the infamous "one drop of
blood" rule by which the races are divided into white and others. 1 12
Obviously, one way to eliminate the deleterious effects created
by the paucity of minority attorneys that results from lawyers' iden
tification with their racial group rather than their occup ational
group is to eradicate racial identification. That eradication will
leave only occupational group identification as a viable vehicle for
group identity and the creation of prestige and esteem. It is to that
concept that I first tum.
A.

Destabilizing Racial Identification

My proposal to destabilize racial identification as a vehicle to
eliminate racial categorizations in order to improve race relations
and eliminate the subordination of minorities by whites is itself the
subject of a full length article that I will not duplicate here. 113 The
imp ort of that theory in this article is that if we destabilize racial
identification then lawyers will no longer be able, consciously or
subconsciously, to rely on their racial identities and the privileges
and principles that flow from those identities to repudiate or act in

contradistinction to the principles and ideals they espouse as legal
professionals. In other words, if race is eliminated as a viable group
characteristic all that will remain is an occupational group charac
teristic that will cause those in the legal profession to adhere more
fully to the ideals that they espouse.
111. Indeed, one argument that can be made in favor of those opposed to affirmative
action is that affirmative action has operated for the last quarter century or more and it has
not lead to a material improvement in race relations or the position of African-Americans in
society and therefore should be jettisoned. For a discussion of the lack of progress that
African-Americans have made since Brown v. Board of Education, 341 U.S. 483 (1954), see
Johnson, supra note 107, at 1046-54. Of course, what this attitude belies is the fact that
whites were able, as· beneficiaries of de jure and de facto racial privileging, to countenance
400 years of racial oppression without too much discomfort or vocal opposition, but that they
cannot abide by 25 years in which race and racial identification are used to provide what at
best would be characterized as marginal benefits to another group.
112. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration:
Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595 (1995);
see also Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans, and the Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
113. See Johnson, supra note 72.
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I briefly sketch here the points and arguments that I made more

fully in my earlier article and encourage the reader to visit that arti-:
cle for further explication of those arguments.114 I start with the
assumption, which pretty much stands unchallenged, that racism is
illogical, and that nothing should turn, no benefits, no detriments,
on an individual's racial identification - that is, one's skin color,
bone structure, and hair texture.115 Given this assumption, why
does racial classification and identity continue to matter so much in
American society?
This fact is even more puzzling when it is recognized that racial
identification and the group identity it fosters is largely socially con
structed.116 H�nce, I remain intrigued about the persistence of the
dichotomous racial classification in American society into white and
others or minority. American society is unusual in that it is one of
the few societies in which, as a result of the "one drop of blood
rule," it

can

be neatly divided into two racial camps: white and

black.117 That racial dichotomy is largely explained by the concept
of whiteness as a property right,118 and the concomitant protection
of that valuable property right by whites who preclude the develop
ment of multiracial categories in American society. I contend that
racial classifications function most effectively as vehicles for dis
crimination and domination when they can be manipulated to
maintain a duality that effectively entrenches the notion of "other
ness" in anyone who is not white. Consequently, the notion of oth
erness is established by using a baseline of white racial purity.119
By defining our racial categories as simply white and black, with
white viewed as dominant and superior and black viewed as inferior
and different, whites and blacks have relied on ostensibly stable ra
cial classifications that benefit whites at the expense of persons of
color and blacks in particular. Whites are able to relegate all per
sons of color to subordinate status by reference to what they are
114. See id.
115. Kwame Anthony Appiah has characterized such attributes as the "grosser morph
ology." See Appiah, supra note 72, at 36-37.
116. Noted legal commentators concur in the assessment that race is socially rather than
biologically constructed:
Racial and ethnic groups, in contrast, are socially constructed. Even though some
physiognomic and other genetic group differences may exist, they are largely inconse
quential for everyday life and public policy. Their importance lies, rather, in the salience
we choose to attribute to them. That being said, societies often do treat race and ethnic
ity as important.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 110, at 860 (footnotes omitted).
117. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 889.
118. See Harris, supra note 75.
119. See Crenshaw, supra note 106, at 1384-87; Johnson, supra note 72, at 903-05.
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not: white. Whiteness then becomes the defining, driving category
by which others are measured.
In order to deconstruct this harmful racial dichotomy that cre
ates otherness and subordination, I contend that society should em
brace, as a transitory vehicle, multiple racial categories and
expressly recognize and acknowledge products of mixed-race
unions as distinct from both blacks and whites. 120 This, I argue, will
create a type of "shade confusion" that will eventually - and it
may be a long, arduous process - destroy the black-wh.ite dichot
omy that currently exists, ultimately reducing race to a meaningless
category, as it should be. I allege further that if racial categories are
destabilized and destroyed, then ethnic categories, which should be
viewed favorably when compared to racial categories because of
their fluidity and positive attributes,121 will rush to fill the void cre
ated by the absence of racial categories.
The current racial typology, however, can and will be eliminated
only if multiracial categories are recognized and allowed to flourish.
To destroy the existing racial typology I tum to the efficiency ra
tionale for trademarks and trademark law and explicate its ana
logue to racial identification and typology. In effect, I view racial
identification or typecasting and the designation of one as black or for that matter, Asian, Native American or Hispanic - as a
"mark" like a trademark that heretofore has been maintained by
whites in order to protect their property right in the attribute or
resource of whiteness.
120. The move to create and recognize multiple racial categories is driven largely by a
desire of parents of mixed-race or biracial children to have a "mixed-race" box placed on the
census for the year 2000. See Linda Mathews, More Than Identity Rides On a New Racial
Category, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1996, at Al, for a discussion of the movement for a new racial
category:
In the past decade, interracial couples have emerged as a political force. They have
organized politicill groups, both at the local and the national level, founded magazines
and businesses that cater to the needs of families like theirs and established web pages
and chat groups on the Internet.
Specifically, the goal for many of these groups is official recognition for multiracial
Americans as separate from the four racial categories the Census Bureau has used since
1977: white; black; American Indian and Alaska native, and Asian and Pacific islander.
The 1990 census also listed another category called "other," and separately asked Amer
icans whether they were of "Hispanic" or "Spanish" origin.
Id. at A7; see also Michel Marriott, Multiracial Americans Ready to Claim Their Own Iden
tity, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at Al (discussing the struggles of multiracial people).
121. Individuals who identify with an ethnic as opposed to a racial group do so on the
basis of a shared history and value system, rather than appearances. Indeed, ethnicity is
viewed as the cultural transmitter of positive values. For further discussion of this issue, see
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism
Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1414-22 (1993).
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By destroying the exclusivity and meaning of the racial mark
through the development of multiracial categories, I hope to make
generic any sort of racial identification and to create a type of
"shade confusion. "122 I acknowledge that in the short run, this
deconstruction of racial identification may have a splintering effect
on people of color and especially blacks.123 It may be true that
blacks will $Ubdivide into smaller subgroups based on things such as
skin color - from light to dark - and other morphological traits.
This decoµstruction, moreover, may have the effect of destabilizing
such race-based programs as affirmative action or racial redistrict
ing that depend on stable racial definitions in which all blacks who
are characterized as such by the one drop rule are eligible for the
benefits of such a program irrespective of the hue of their skin.124
In the long run, however, I predict that any such splintering effect

among blacks will also have a spillover effect on the definition of
white and will destroy the dichotomy that has driven racial relations
in this country for centuries.125
To demonstrate the benefits created by shade confusion and a
society in which a multiplicity ·of racial categories exist premised
predominantly on ethnic rather than a binary racial classification, I
shift the focus to another racial-ethnic group, Hispanics, who oc
cupy a relatively unusual position in the racial hierarchy of the
United States.126 As currently constructed, "Hispanic" denotes an
122. See generally Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Color Trademarks: Shades of
Confusion, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 554 (1993) (discussing the doctrine of shade confusion in
the trademark context).

123. 'fypical is the following:
The multiracial campaign has drawn the support of some people who are actively
involved in civil rights issues
But the [census] proposal . . . has drawn fire from other civil rights groups, including
the National Urban League,' the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the National Council of La Raza and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law.
,
Their objection, spelled out in letters, public testimony and journal �rticles, is that
the availability of a multiracial category would reduce the number of Americans claim
ing to belong to long-recognized racial minority groups, dilute the electoral power of
those groups and make it more difficult to enforce the nation's civil rights laws.
Mathews, supra note 120, at A7.
.

.

.

•

124. Although the potential loss of such programs or the potential difficulty in maintain
ing them represents legitimate objections to my plan to destabilize racial identity, query
whether these arguments have any force given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence disman
tling affirmative action and racial redistricting among· other things? See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. In effect, what I am arguing is that if we are truly going to be a color
blind nation with respect to laws and their enforcement - something I find hard to imagine
because of my context and life-horizon - let's go all the way and eliminate the "meaningless" and harmful racial categories that continue to persist.
·

125. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 928..
126. See id. at 935-36.
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ethnic group that consists of people of all racial types. Unlike white
or black, Hispanic as a racial category is meaningless because a His
panic can be of any race. Hence, being identified as Hispanic im
parts no racial identification - and, relatedly, no racial stereotypes.
To a large extent, the designation "Hispanic" represents a fluid and
rather large ethnic group consisting of many subgroups or types.
These subgroups or types are linked loosely to each other, and they
are grouped not by reference to a racial division, but by a common
language or heritage.121
Hence, a lesson is learned and a paradigm is embraced that
originates from the treatment of Hispanics as an

ethnic group.

Con

sequently, I contend that the ethnic group of "blackness" or
African-American should and will develop to fill the void created
by the destabilization of racial categories.12s Given the "black ex
perience" and this country's history of de jure and then de facto
segregation, African-Americans have developed as a people or eth
nic community into a nation within a nation with their own unique
ethnic identity. Hence, I conclude that maintaining African-Ameri

can as an ethnic definition, while destabilizing racial classifications,
will have a positive and rewarding effect.
This proposal for destabilization of racial categories relates to
the thesis of this article as follows:

I contend that such a

destabilization of racial identity and its substitution with ethnicity

will lessen the conflict between the ideals espoused by members of
the legal profession - the ideals of liberty and equality - and the
maintenance of the largely white law firms, which reflects the flow
of benefits to attorneys because of their racial identification as
whites. I anticipate, however, that many readers will object to the
supplantation of race with ethnicity on the ground that the
problems with group affiliation or identity that lead to the under
representation of minority attorneys at elite firms will not be re
duced as a consequence.
Although this contention represents a legitimate counterargu
ment, it is overcome by the observation that we view and respect
127. Because the term is broadly defined, many people are able to claim Hispanic origin
or heritage. The only common denominator appears to be a connection with a Spanish
speaking ancestor from North, South, or Central America.
128. The ethnic definition of "African American" is not synonymous with the racial iden·
tification of blacks as currently socially constructed in American society. Quite the contrary,
pursuant to the ethnic definition of African American that I envision, individuals who are
phenotypically white may be ethnically African American and conversely not all individuals
who are phenotypically black will or should be considered ethnically African American. For
further discussion of this important point, see Johnson, supra note 72, at 936.
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ethnicity in a positive manner when compared to race. In a perfect
world, neither race nor ethnicity would exist as a vehicle to brand
and label people as "other." However, the positive aspects of
ethnicity, the "nomos" created by ethnicity, would be lost.129 As we
do not reside in a perfect world, I believe the emphasis on ethnicity
should be embraced, and the social construction of race rejected
because it is much easier to mask one's ethnicity and, if necessary,
reconstruct one's ethnic identity to avoid the costly effects of being
labeled "other" or disapprovingly different. Consequently, there is
an illusory feature of ethnicity that does not exist for race; ethnicity,
I argue, can be manipulated to extract positive benefits and reduce
the negative consequences or costs.
Hence, I believe that if ethnicity, rather than race, is embraced
societally as the vehicle pursuant to which identities are .character
ized, lawyers will, like other citizens, be able to mask and manipu
late their identity to their benefit. Ethnicity, rather than race, gives
the individual control over whether she reveals her true identity or,
failing that, constructs a false ethnic identity to benefit herself. This
may seem implausible in the world that currently exists, but I be
lieve that skepticism is more a product of our current context than a
true sense of whether such a world can exist.
To prove my point I will provide one example: Throughout this
article I have referred to the distinction between white and black
attorneys and the underrepresentation of blacks in elite firms. I
have not referred to or addressed the practice by some firms not to
hire Jews.130 This refusal was once a common practice. However,
ask yourself what would happen if that same odious practice reap
peared at some firms? How successful would these firms be in po
licing this odious barrier? How successful would they be in
identifying those who do not self-identify themselves as Jewish?131
129. For an extended definition and discussion of "nomos," see Johnson, supra note 121,
at 1419-20. Robert Cover defines nomos as a community's "normative universe," the "com
monalities of meaning that make continued normative activity possible." Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 91 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14
(1983).
130. See Jerome Hornblass, The Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1641 (1993)

(discussing discrimination against Jews by New York law firms practicing corporate, patent,
and maritime law); Note, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs - Discriminatory

Effects in Law Firm Hiring Practices, 73 YALE LJ. 625 (1964).
131. Perhaps an argument can be made that in some instances Jews can be identified -

although I am not sure how. I assume that if an individual is wearing a yarmulke, has a
beard, and long dark hair, one might make a reasonable assumption that the individual is an
Orthodox or Hasidic Jew. However, even in this context, that assumption is not absolutely
correct. In addition, if the individual is Jewish, the individual can choose - assuming there is
no violation of religious dictates that constrain choice - to alter their appearance to conform
to whatever happens to be the norm.
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Better yet, why don't firms discriminate against Italians, Russians,
or those ethnically French-Canadian? I think the answer is clear:
Ethnicity, unlike race, is not a fixed and immutable characteristic
that cannot be manipulated and hidden.
Thus, my contention is that if racial identification is destabilized
and replaced with ethnicity, the tension that is produced when law
yers belong to one group - a racial group - with one set of domi
nant ideals or principles predicated on that group's identity, while
simultaneously belonging to another group - the occupational
group of lawyers - with an antithetical set of ideals and principles
predicated on that group's identity, will be largely eliminated.
Once racial identification disappears, no ethnic identity - or any
other kind of identity - will arise to supplant it if the principles
associated with that group identity are antithetical to the principles
of equality and justice.
Nevertheless, if one cannot embrace my destabilizing race heu
ristic as a realistic vehicle for reducing the racial tensions that cre
ate the underrepresentation of minorities in elite firms, there is yet
another, more traditional vehicle to correct that underrepresenta
tion. Of course, I am referring to the express utilization of affirma
tive action as a tool to increase the number of minority lawyers in
elite firms.
B.

Affi rmative Action

One can approach the affirmative action debate from many dif
ferent perspectives.132 Indeed, the debate over affirmative action
has taken a strange twist recently. Recipients of affirmative action
have decried its use and given validity to the arguments of other,
more traditional critics who characterize it as reverse discrimina
tion.133 As a past recipient of affirmative action, I can speak per
sonally that had it not been in place at Princeton University, later at
132. Any attempt to recite or catalogue the many articles and books that address the
affirmative action issue could not be exhaustive. The books that I have perused in preparing
this article include: RONALD J. Ficus, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE Ac.
TION (1992); Kerr GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1983);
BARRY R. GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE (1978); REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (Barry
R. Gross ed., 1977); MICHEL RosENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE AcnoN AND JUSTICE (1991); So.
CIAL JUSTICE & PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT (Wtlliam T. Blackstone & Robert D. Heslep
eds., 1977).
133. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 28; SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OuR CHARAC·
TER 111-25 (1990). Also consider statements by Justice Clarence Thomas commonly viewed
as anti-affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[G]ovemment-sponsored
racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired
by malicious prosecution. In each instance, it is racial discrimination plain and simple.").
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the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, and fi
nally in legal academia, both at the University of Minnesota and the
University of Virginia Schools of Law, I would not be in the posi
tion I am today, and for that I am eternally grateful.134 What is
important for the thesis of this article is what effect the absence of
affirmative action would have had on my career and, more impor
tant, the effect that the aggressive use of affirmative action would
have on blacks in current society, generally, and in law firms, in
particular. In my own case, I can readily assert that had there been
no affirmative action, I too would have channeled my efforts to
some other endeavor like sports, in a best case scenario, or crime, in
a worst case scenario, to the exclusion of academics. 13s
This section demonstrates that the aggressive use of affirmative
action continues to benefit society and should be expanded to in
clude elite law firms. The aggressive use of affirmative action is
warranted whether there exists only a perception of discriminatory
use of standards - what I characterize as the present and forward
looking defense of affirmative action - or an actual discriminatory
use of standards - a backwards- or reparations-looking defense of
affirmative action.
In this section, I will assume that standards have been applied
historically in a discriminatory manner, consciously or subcon
sciously, thus calling for the use of affirmative action - a use that is
backwards-looking - to correct past acts of societally impermissi
ble discrimination. I do so because an analysis of the stated reasons
for the underrepresentation of minority lawyers at elite law firms,
as addressed previously, do not pass muster.136 If the standards em
ployed by elite law firms to hire lawyers have been applied discrimi
natorily, either consciously or subconsciously, by whites to protect
their hegemonic position in society and to gain intragroup status,137

134. I cannot say with certainty that affinnative action played a role in any admission or
hiring decision that has affected my legal career. On the other hand, I believe that there is a
high degree of probability that without preferential treatment based on my race, I would not
have been afforded the opportunities that I have taken advantage of to date. Indeed, I am
proud to proclaim, and rightly so, that I have been a recipient of affirmative action.
135. I played freshman baseball at Princeton for about a month, at which point I deter
mined it was detrimentally affecting my studies; I then quit the team to concentrate on the
difficult transition from a predominantly black high school, where I received a relatively poor
education, to an elite college, where many of my white peer students had tremendous advan
tages when measured by their parents' investment in their human capital. See Johnson, supra
note 121, at 1438-43. Had academics not been a viable alternative, I would have devoted
what I perceive to be my considerable energies to sports - I would have given it my all.

136. See supra section I.B.
137. See id.
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remedial steps must be taken to ensure that the manipulation of the
standards that leads to the underrepresentation is corrected.
This section attempts to accomplish the most difficult task one
undertakes in defense of affirmative action: providing a philosophi
cal defense of affirmative action that does not also legitimate or
make acceptable "first-order discrimination" - discrimination
against people of color on the basis that they are biologically or
culturally inferior to whites.138 In addition, a philosophical and
moral defense to the two oft-repeated popular arguments against
the use of affirmative action is provided herein.
Affirmative action can be justified legally, philosophically, and
morally as remedial action necessary to overcome the effects of dis
crimination and to lead to a future state in which blacks are propor
tionately represented in all fields, including elite law firms. First,
the key terms of justice, equality, and affirmative action must be
defined.139 In this context, affirmative action is defined as the pref
erential hiring of minorities - primarily blacks - at elite law firms
for the purpose of increasing the proportion of minorities in these
firms so that their number at least matches their number within the
legal profession. Moreover, the preferential treatment may be nec
essary and required to achieve a goal or to fill a quota.140
Defining equality and justice, however, is a much more difficult
task that, standing alone, could be the subject of an article of sub
stantial length. Suffice it to say, if philosophers cannot agree on a
finite definition of these two ephemeral concepts, such a resolution
will not be proposed here. However, to address the issues raised by
this article, I provide tentative definitions in order to establish a
framework for discussion.
The definition of equality used herein is premised on the norma
tive proposition that all individuals are morally equal as individuals,
a proposition that serves as the base of modem liberal theory. 14 1
This has been referred to by Rosenfeld as the "postulate of equal
ity" and it proscribes "using differences of status or birth as the
basis for treating persons unequally."142 Implicit, however, in the
definition of equality are two very different notions of measuring
138. See ROSENFELD, supra note 132, at 4.
139. See id. at 12. See also REVERSE D1sCRIMINATION, supra note 132, at 4, for the origi
nal narrow definition of affinnative action.
140. See ROSENFELD, supra note 132, at 47-48. For a discussion focusing on the appropri
ate and legitimate use of quotas, see Johnson, supra note 107.
141. See ROSENFELD, supra note 132, at 20-21.
142. Id. at 21.
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versus

"equality

of

[E]quality of result means that each member of the class designated
as the subject of equality ends up with an equal lot (of the good being
allocated). Equality of opportunity, on the other hand, means that
each member of the subject class has the same opportunity as every
other member to obtain the scarce good, but that all members will not
end up with an equal lot, as some but not all will succeed in acquiring
the scarce good . . . .

. . . In short, in terms of distinction drawn by Dworkin, equality of
opportunity may not result in equal treatment, but it does . . . respect
every person's right to treatment as an equal.143
Justice also has multiple meanings: It can refer to distributive,
compensatory, or procedural justice. Rejecting the narrow Aris
totelean view that distributive justice relates to the distribution of
public goods by public authorities and compensatory justice relates
to the distribution of private goods by private citizens,144 I broadly
define distributive justice to include "goods and evils of a nonpoliti
cal kind that can be distributed by private citizens to other private
citizens."145 This definition encompasses acts of distribution as well
as the states of affairs that exist following distribution. Thus, in its
broadest sense, distributive justice includes the process and product
of distribution by both public and private players.
Jules Coleman has best defined compensatory justice:
Corrective [compensatory] justice is a matter of justice . . . not be
cause it promotes justice in the distribution of holdings, but rather
because it remedies unjust departures from the prevailing distribution
of holdings. [Moreover, compensatory justice provides an indepen
dent justice principle] precisely because it may be legitimately in
voked to protect or reinstate distributions of holdings which would
themselves fail the test of distributive justice.146

Procedural justice in Rawlsian terminology consists of two dis
tinct notions. The first, called "perfect procedural justice," depends
on an independent criterion of justice:
to determine what would be a just compensation or distribution and a
procedure to lead to the desired outcome as determined by the in
dependent criterion. If the procedure assures the desired outcome,
143. Id. at 23-24 {footnote omitted}.
144. See id. at 30.
145. Id. (citing JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 107 {1973)).
146. Julius L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 L. &
5, 6-7 {1983).
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then one has, according to Rawls, "perfect procedural justice"; if it
does not, then one has "imperfect procedural justice."147

Simpler is the concept ·of "pure procedural justice," which simply
requires that a fair procedure be followed in the distributive
process.148
1.

RejUting the Attacks on Affirmative Action

The two popular arguments that attack the appropriateness and
justness of affirmative action, at first glance, appear irrefutable
from a philosophic perspective.149 The first argument rests on the
notion that any program that discriminates, for whatever reason, is
unjust.150 Because affirmative action programs provide preferential
treatment based on the color of an individual's skin (and other rea
sons), and therefore discriminate in favor of people of color, conse
quently, affirmative action in hiring by necessity also must be
unjust. A more advanced version of this argument is that affirma
tive action programs provide benefits to individuals "simply be
cause they are persons of color." The immutable characteristic of a
person's color or ethnic identity is, of course, irrelevant pursuant to
our conception of equality,151 and therefore it is unjust to provide
147. RosENFEID, supra note 132, at 41 (citing JOHN RAwr.s, A THEORY OF JusnCE 85·87
{1971)).
148: See id. at 41 (citing RAWLS, supra note 147, at 86).
149. The two arguments against affirmative action summarized herein and the critique of
same are taken largely from Thomas E. Hill , Jr., The Message of Affirmative Action, 8 Soc
PHIL. & PoLY., Spring 1991, at 108.
150. See id. at 112. I am ignoring for the sake of argument and clarity the objections that
.

can be made to this very sparse, yet incredibly complicated statement. In other words, the
premise that all discrimination is unjust neatly conflates the notion of harm and remedy by
solidifying the status quo in favor of those who have been the beneficiaries of previous dis·
crimination. Moreover, the assertion that any discrimination is unjust implies an incorrect
and inappropriate meaning of the word discrimination that is different from the meaning
used herein. Even when discrimination is used in this different, pejorative sense, it is too
simplistic and ignores the rather obvious fact that this society's distribution of resources and
goods is one based on discrimination. For example, the decision to bail out the savings and
loan industry through the use of public monies is a perfect example of a legislative and execu·
tive decision to discriminate in favor of those in the financial-capital markets at the expense
of others. For a discussion of the savings and loan crisis which lead to the formation of
Resolution Trust Corporation, see Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters
Again, 42 DuKE L.J. 469 (1992). That money, for example, could very easily have been used
to fund a "Marshall Plan" for the inner cities. Thus, those who blithely claim that all discrim·
ination is unjust must explain why it is that only discrimination that favors minorities is
unjust

151. Once again, I am assuming for the ease of discussion that those espousing these
statements operate with a selective naivet� that allows them to make these sorts of ridiculous
statements in good faith, and with a straight face. I find it impossible to believe that any
intelligent person in American society currently believes that race and gender are irrelevant
characteristics in American society. See, e.g., CORNELL WEsr, RAcE MATIERS {1993); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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benefits to these individuals based solely on these immutable
characteristics.
This first and most simplistic attack on affirmative action pro
grams improperly conflates two very different meanings of "dis
crimination," hence leaving wholly unsupported its conclusion that
discrimination as it is used in the affirmative action context is
wrong. As pointed out above,152 elite law firms use many different
evaluative criteria to assess the merits .of entry-level candidates in
their hiring process. In doing so, for example, distinctions are made
between individuals from certain schools - a law firm may be will
ing to hire someone from the middle of the class at an elite, top
twenty law school, whereas that same firm only may be willing to
hire someone from the top five percent of a class at a lesser, top
fifty school - individuals who anticipate practicing in certain spe
cialties, individuals related to or known to individuals in the hiring
firm, and individuals who are recommended by other individuals;
the list is almost endless.
Moreover, to discriminate is "to make a distinction in favor of or
against a person or thing on a categorical basis rather than accord
ing to actual merit . . . to make or constitute a distinction in or
between; differentiate."153 As a result, it is beyond peradventure
that affirmative action programs do discriminate in the sense that
they require individuals or institutions and, in this case, law firms,
to make distinctions.
The claim that discrimination by institutions is unjust cannot,
therefore, be based on the accepted definition and meaning of dis
crimination. If it were, law firms would have to conduct lotteries
pursuant to which each individual applicant, irrespective of qualifi
cations, would have an equal chance of being hired at the law firm

152� See supra section J.B.
153. THE RANDOM HousE COLLEGE D1cnoNARY 379 (Jess Stein et al. eds., 1982) (em

phasis added). The use of the loaded term "merit" in the definition detracts from its useful
ness and presupposes that there is some accepted standard that is being deviated from when
one "discriminates." Determining what is meritocratic in the hiring process is a large part of
the issue and is discussed supra section J.B. See also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Scholarly Para
digms: A New Tradition Based on Context and Color, 16 VT. L. REv. 913 (1992) (discussing
the analogous issue of what is meritocratic in the legal academy). In any event, I am assum
ing for the sake of discussion that whatever the meritocratic metric, discrimination occurs
when one evaluates the candidates evenly according to that metric and then departs from
that metric to favor or discriminate against an individual based on a factor that is not origi
nally included in the metric. The paradigmatic case in law firm hiring is when one has two or
more candidates for the same position with equal grade point averages from the same or
similar schools, but one candidate is favored over the other because she is athletic, or took
more tax courses; or is married, or is the niece of a major client of the firm.
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of her choice.154 This would result in true equality of opp ortunity
and would respect every p erson's right to treatment as an equal. Of
course, no one is willing to argue that a lottery be conducted to
award entitlements like positions in elite law firms. Obviously,
then, the claim that all discrimination is unjust is based on a pejora
tive use of the term discrimination "meaning (roughly) 'making use
of a distinction in an unjust or illegitimate way.' "155
The problem with the use of discrimination in its p ejorative
sense is that it begs the question of what is unjust and illegitimate
and fails to provide any basis, pro or con, that the discrimination
required by affirmative action is unjust or illegitimate in the context
in which it is employed. In other words, " [a]lthough one may in the
end, conclude that all public use of racial and gender distinctions is
unjust, to do so requires more of an argument than the simple one

(just given) that merely exploits an ambiguity of the word 'discrimi
nation.' " 156 More precisely, the simplistic argument against affirm
ative action fails to provide a principled basis to differentiate
between permissible and impermissible forms of discrimination
(distinctions) that take place in the hiring process; it simply con
cludes that affirmative action (distinctions) based on race or color is
imp ermissible.

The second, more sophisticated argument against affirmative ac
tion is also loaded with misleading terminology that is exploited to
reach the conclusion that affirmative action is unjust. The assertion
that individuals are benefited simply because they are p ersons of
color is wrong in that it ignores the historical and other justifica
tions for the use of affirmative action in our society.
To say that someone favor a person "simply because that person is
black (or female)" implies that there is no further reason, purpose, or
justification, as if one merely had an utterly arbitrary preference for
dark skin as opposed to light or female anatomy over male anatomy.
But no serious advocate of affirmative action thinks the program is
154. For example, the law firm could establish minimal standards such as graduating
within the top quarter of the class or bar passage on the first attempt. Presumably if these
standards were put in place and a lottery conducted, the firm would hire those selected by the
lottery and perhaps spend more time monitoring these new hires to assess their skills and
their ability to complete the tasks that they have been assigned. I am uncertain whether such
a lottery would lead to more or less turnover in the associate ranks if firms were forced to
accept hires as a result of a lottery with no additional screening. Given the unhappiness and
unease currently experienced by associates, the question exists whether a modification of the
current system may perhaps be warranted. For a discussion of associate dissatisfaction with
large firm practice, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine:
The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1249-56
(1991).
155. Hill, supra note 149, at 112.
156. Id. at 112-13.
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justified by such personal preferences. On the contrary, advocates ar
gue that, given our historical situation, quite general principles of jus
tice or utility justify the temporary classificatory use of race and
gender. That being black or white, male or female, does not in itself
make anyone morally better or more deserving is acknowledged on
all sides .
. . . The proper conclusion, then, is not that any current program
that makes use of race and gender categories is simply committing the
same old wrongs in reverse. The worst wrongs of the past went far
beyond merely the arbitrary use of categories [; they treated African
Americans and women as no human being should be treated]; more
over, it has yet to be established that the new use of these categories
in affirmative action is in fact arbitrary {like the old use). An arbi
trary category is one used without good justification; the charge that
affirmative action programs use race and gender categories unjustifi
ably is just what is at issue, not something we can assume at the
start.157

2.

The Arguments in Favor of Affirmative Action: A
Philosophical Perspective

A moral and philosophical defense of affirmative action can be
made that results in the just and appropriate use of affirm ative ac
tion in elite law firms. However, justifying the use of affirmative
action, from either a moral or philosophical perspective, requires
more than the mouthing of simple platitudes that mask what, it is
contended, are other motives. Instead, any legitimate discussion of
the justificatory purposes of affirmative action must start with con
text - a contextual framework centered firmly in the reality of race
relations in this society's past, present, and future.
Of the many arguments made in favor of affirmative action,
most of them fall into two distinct categories: those that look to the
future, and those that look to the past. The utilitarian, future-look
ing justifications for affirmative action focus on the remedial aspect
of affirm ative action and the resulting benefits to future society.
They are premised on the perception that standards are consciously
or subconsciously applied in a discriminatory fashion. Moreover,
what is important, whether accurate or inaccurate, is the perception
of the discriminatory use of standards. Pursuant to this rationale,
affirmative action is used to dispel misperception and demonstrate
societal commitment to equality.15s
157. Id. at 113-14.
158. Some of the societal benefits that flow from the aggressive use of affinnative action
are detailed below:
For example, some argue that affinnative action will ease racial tensions, prevent riots,
improve services in minority neighborhoods, reduce unemployment, remove inequities

1058

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1005

Conversely, the reparations-based backward-looking justifica
tion for affirmative action focuses on remedying past wrongs.
(There is an assumption that in the past meritocratic standards were
applied in a discriminatory fashion.)159 And although these two
temporal perspectives provide excellent rationales for the appropri
ate use of affirmative action, there is yet a third temporal perspec
tive that provides an equally valid rationale for its use. That
temporal perspective is centered on neither the past nor the future
but on the present.
[T]he values that give affirmative action its point are best seen as
cross-time values that fall outside the exclusively forward-looking and
backward-looking perspectives. They include having a history of ra
cial and gender relations governed, so far as possible, by the ideals of
mutual respect, trust, and fair opportunity for all.
. . . The main suggestion is that, ideally, a central purpose of
affirmative action would be to communicate a much-needed message,
sincerely and effectively. The message is called for not just as a means
to future good relations or a dutiful payment of a debt incurred by
our past. It is called for by the ideal of being related to other human
beings over time, so that our histories and biographies reflect the re
sponses of those who deeply care about fair opportunity, mutual trust,
and respect for all.160

In creating a philosophical justification for affirmative action, I

utilize a contextual approach that focuses on contemporary Ameri
can society in which equality is not defined as a belief that all indi
viduals possess equal abilities or intelligence. The so-called
postulate of equality, the normative proposition that all individuals
are morally equal as individuals,161 is however the starting point for
the discussion in this section. That postulate of equality focuses on
in income distribution, eliminate racial and sexual prejudice, and enhance the self
esteem of blacks and women. Some have called attention to the fact that women and
minorities provide alternative perspectives on history, literature, philosophy, and poli
tics, and that this has beneficial effects for both education and research.
Hill, supra note 149, at 116.

159. Focusing on a reparations-based or backward-looking justification for affirmative
action requires a different justification:
A radically different strategy for justifying affirmative action is to rely on backward
looking arguments. Such arguments call our attention to certain events in the past and
assert that because these past events occurred, we have certain duties now. The modem
philosopher who most influentially endorsed such arguments was W.D. Ross. He argued
that there are duties of fidelity, justice, gratitude, and reparation that have a moral force
independent of any tendency these may have to promote good consequences. . . . The
Rossian principle that is often invoked in affirmative action debates is a principle of
reparation.
Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 123, 127.
161. See ROSENFELD, supra note 132, at 20-21.
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the individual and the treatment of the individual in our society.
Thus, "at the very least, the postulate of equality condemns using
differences of status or birth [or color] as the basis for treating per
sons unequally."162
The postulate of equality requires that goods be distributed to
allow each individual to realize fully the goals of her life plan if
enough goods are available. Of course, with respect to the distribu
tion of scarce goods, like positions or jobs at elite law firms, some
just method of distribution must be enacted that does not violate
the postulate of equality.
At first glance, affirmative action seems to violate the postulate
of equality because it apparently treats similarly situated individuals
differently based on the accident of their race. Two very different
possible goals can justify methods of distribution of scarce re
sources or goods. The first is equality of result, which requires that
each member of the subject class receives the same amount of the
good allocated. On the other hand, equality of opportunity man
dates that each member of the subject class have the same or equal
opportunity as every other member to obtain the scarce good.
Thus, with respect to equality of opportunity, not all will wind up
with the scarce good, but each will have a formal - procedural right to obtain the good.163
With respect to entry into elite law firms, it is assumed that what
is sought in the hiring process, which constitutes the allocation of a
scarce resource - job openings or positions within the firm - is
equality of opportunity and not equality of result. The justification
for this assumption is that not all applicants can receive an equal
share of the resource being distributed. The problem with employ
ing equality of opportunity, however, is that there are two types:
"prospect-regarding equality of opportunity" and "means-regarding
equality of opportunity." Prospect-regarding equality occurs when
two or more persons have equal opportunities for obtaining the de
sired good. A lottery is a perfect example of prospect regarding
equality of opportunity. By contrast, means-regarding equality of
opportunity is defined as a situation in which two or more competi
tors for the scarce resource have the same tools for obtaining the
desired good.164
To illustrate this, let us suppose that two persons, one being twice as
strong as the other, compete for a single good G that can only be

162. Id. at 21.
163. See id. at 23-24.
164. See id. at 25.
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obtained through the exertion of physical strength. Without tools,
other than their brute strength, their prospects for obtaining G are
unequal. Moreover, if they are both given the same instrument - say
an instrument that is capable of increasing its user's physical strength
by a factor of two - they will both possess means-regarding equal
opportunity, but their prospects would remain unequal. Conversely,
to grant them prospect-regarding equality of opportunity, it will be
necessary to provide them with unequal tools for enhancing physical
strength. In this latter case, the allocation of unequal means becomes
a prerequisite to the achievement of prospect-regarding equality of
opportunity. 1 65

Moreover, even when competitors receive additional tools to
obtain the scarce resource, for example, education at an elite law
school, all that is achieved is marginal means-regarding equality of
opportunity.
In other words, in the context of inequality in initial circumstances that is, the prevailing circumstances immediately preceding the alloca
tion of equal means - the institution of marginal means-regarding
equality of opportunity is unlikely to bring about equality of result or
prospect-regarding equality of opportunity. 166

Applying these theories of justice and opportunity to the debate
over affirmative action leads to the rather obvious conclusion that
means-regarding equality of opportunity cannot be achieved if the
competition for positions at elite law firms is premised on being
treated equally, that is, irrespective of race. The premise of equal
competition inevitably will fail, given that different treatment will
result from one's racial identification combined with the hiring at
torney's position within another racial group that influences her hir
ing decision.167 In other words, if two competing claimants for the
same position are of different races, given the existence of group
dynamics, relative preferences, and the production of intra-group
status, it stands to reason that the applicant whose race matches the
race of the dominant group will have a better chance of being hired
for that position.
Another objection to affirmative action deserves to be ad
dressed directly. That objection stems from classical liberalism's
fundamental requirement that similarly situated individuals be
treated similarly. The problem, however, with classical liberalism's
emphasis on the individual and its requirement of equal treatment
of all individuals is that it presupposes an ideal world that does not
exist. Moreover, by requiring the equal treatment of individuals
165. Id.
166. Id. at 25-26.
167. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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based on notions of meritocracy, it fixes in place a scheme of distri
bution of benefits (distributive justice) that, although perhaps
"fairly" distributed based on neutral principles or practices (proce
dural justice), does not take into account the individual's identity or
place within society (compensatory justice).
Meaningful action is necessary to correct the underrepresenta
tion of minorities in elite law firms. Affirmative action is needed to
ensure that equal opportunity is truly part of a process that contin
ues to favor whites over nonwhites when so-called neutral, objec
tive criteria are employed. This society's history, its development,
and its current politics and way of life are, to a large degree, based
on race. Using affirmative action programs that take race into ac
count as a positive factor is simply an appropriate and realistic way
to respond.
One of the sad facts in the history of this country is the residue
that remains from the distribution of social goods on the basis of
race, gender, disability, and class. This history has produced tradi
tional inequalities that infect all of our social institutions. To un<;ler
stand the nature of production and distribution of social wealth, we
must analyze each institution mindful of the distortions that our his
tory and traditions have produced.
The current super-heated rhetoric surrounding affirmative ac
tion sees affirmative action as primarily producing a social cost that
must be justified. The proposals for the use of colorblind and nar
rowly meritocratic selection processes are advanced as the only way
to reduce these social costs. But this rhetoric, perhaps due to its
selective historical blindness, has things exactly wrong. Affirmative
action, properly designed and implemented, can only reduce social
costs.

It must be recognized that there are current social costs involved
in the use of evaluative standards that lead to the underrepresenta
tion of blacks in important occupations like partners at elite law
firms. Some of these costs are described in the following passage
from the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
The failure of our society to extend job opportunities to [blacks] is
an economic waste. The purchasing power of the country is not being
fully developed. This, in turn, acts as a brake upon potential increases
in gross national product. In addition, the country is burdened with
added costs for the payment of unemployment compensation, relief,
disease, and crime.
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National prosperity will be increased through the proper training
of [blacks] for more skilled employment together with the removal of
barriers for obtaining such employment.168

Affirmative action prevents the economic and social waste that
would otherwise result from the use of these allegedly neutral hir
ing standards employed by elite law firms.
IV.
Lawyers must practice what they preach. Their failure to do so
as it pertains to hiring and promoting minorities at elite firms is
problematic for what it reveals about law and lawyers and what it
portends for the future. If lawyers do not make significant progress
to hire and promote minorities proportionate with their representa
tion in the profession, lawyers run the risk of losing the prestige the relative preference - associated with becoming a member of
this noble profession.
I have presented two proposals, both attributable to critical race
theory, to correct the underrepresentation of minorities at these
elite firms. The first, destabilizing racial identity to eliminate the
intragroup preference that causes white candidates to be preferred
over similarly qualified minority candidates, represents a long-term
strategy that would require society to deemphasize and eliminate
racial identification. The second, more circumspect strategy calls
for those within the legal profession to employ the same remedy of
affirmative action that the profession developed and imposed upon
schools and other employers, to remedy the effects of past and pres
ent racial discrimination in law firms' hiring practices.
The focus on these remedies suggested by critical race theory
indicates that using insights gleaned from that body of thought can
profoundly influence the development of the law and the legal sys
tem, notwithstanding the field's relatively recent birth and incorpo
ration within the halls of academe. Indeed, although critical race
theorists cannot point to one single body of law as the progeny of
the discipline, they can point to the origination and development of
significant theories that have influenced the evolution of the law in
innumerable ways. Critical race theorists' influence on law and
legal systems not only has been profound, it also will be lasting.

168. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2515.

